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ABSTRACT 
 
The term Collective Remittances (CRs) refers to the money sent by migrant 
associations, known as Hometown Associations (HTAs), to Community-Based 
Organisations (CBOs) in their hometowns for financing public works projects. Few 
cases of CR are known in Honduras. The only ones reported are among the Garífuna 
ethnic group living on the Caribbean Coast, and with a large migrant community in 
New York City (NYC).  
 
This mini-master’s thesis is the first study written on CRs in Honduras. It studies CR 
experiences in four Garífuna hometowns and their corresponding HTAs in NYC. It 
answers three questions: How do CRs work in each case? What are the determinants for 
HTAs to provide CRs to the hometowns? And what are the determinants for local CBOs 
in the hometowns to use the CRs effectively to provide public goods in the hometowns?  
 
CR is conceptualised as a contract between two parties: the HTA, which is the principal 
that chooses which local group and project to finance, and the local CBO, which is the 
agent possessing more information on which projects could be carried out in the 
hometowns, and which finally executes these projects. 
 
The study concludes that the existence of HTAs in the USA is explained by the socially 
enforced institution of the hijos del pueblo (sons of the town) having a duty to help their 
hometowns, as well as the private benefits of preserving Garífuna traditions and the 
possibility of helping repatriate dead immigrants. Fulfilling this duty (and the 
consequent prestige attained) provides the incentives to send CRs home. In the cases 
studied, CRs were used to partly finance potable water projects, electricity projects, 
road paving, a community centre and the construction of a Catholic temple. In most of 
the cases HTAs worked with a local development organisation, known as Patronato, 
which formed specific committees for executing projects, for example the water and the 
electricity committees. For the construction of the temple, a religious organisation 
known as Pastoral was the local partner.  
 
The CR contract established was of an “implicit” nature, which is unwritten and 
informal. Despite the fact that HTAs have in the past financed many projects, today 
they are more reluctant to supply CR. Current Patronatos are inactive or unrecognised 
by the community. HTAs don’t trust that Patronatos have sufficient capacity, so 
selecting projects is difficult.  Five limiting determinants were identified; some of them 
prevent CR being sent at all, while others reduce the effectiveness of financed projects. 
Unwritten or unclear rules (institutions) within the HTAs and the local CBOs can 
generate conflicts and reduce motivation. The lack of mechanisms for signalling the 
hometowns’ needs also makes project selection difficult. Nonexistent or unwritten rules 
for supplying CRs and for monitoring their use may result in the ineffectiveness of  
financed projects.  
 
To overcome these problems, it is suggested that formal rules are established within and 
between the HTAs and recipient CR groups. Participation of local authorities in the 
definition of the towns’ necessities should be addressed with HTA financial assistance, 
and possible partnerships with other local NGOs are also suggested. 
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1 Introduction 
  
Since the mid-1990s a long established practice among the Latin-American migrant 
communities in the USA has gained public attention. The term Collective Remittance 
(CR) refers to the funds sent by migrant Hometown Associations (HTAs) to their 
hometowns for financing public works. Despite the fact many Honduran HTAs exist, 
few examples of CR are known. Difficulties are mentioned in the known cases. The 
following thesis is a research of CR in Honduras, which applies the Principal-Agent 
(PA) Approach, belonging to the New Institutional Economics (NIE), as a theoretical 
framework. CR is an unexplored subject in Honduras and this research probably 
constitutes the first of its kind in the country.  
 
The objective of this exploratory study is to establish how CRs currently work in 
Honduras, and to indicate what the most relevant determinants are for the effective 
participation of Honduran HTAs  in the provision of public goods in the home towns 
 
The paper is structured in five chapters. The first chapter conceptualises CR; it 
describes the Honduran experience and presents objectives and questions of the 
research. Chapter two summarises the basic assumptions of New Institutional 
Economics, and discusses the Principal-Agent Approach. It conceptualises CR as a 
contract between the HTAS in the USA and the CBOs in their hometowns. Since the 
HTAs posses less information than the hometown CBOs, it is difficult for them to select 
the appropriate CBO with whom to transact and, once the contract is established, to 
monitor the work carried out by the selected CBO.  
 
Two general hypotheses are proposed. They predict that HTAs do not have CR 
transactions with the local CBOs due to high search-information costs (Adverse 
Selection Problems) and that the projects financed by HTAs are not effective due to high 
enforcing costs (Moral Hazard Problems). 
 
The research methodology is explained in chapter three. Hypotheses were applied to the 
Garífuna, an ethnic group with the only known experiences of CR in Honduras. The 
Garífuna live on the Caribbean coast, and have a large migrant community in New York 
City. Key decision-makers in four HTAs in the USA and in local groups from three 
hometowns were interviewed. Chapter four presents the research results. The fifth and 
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final chapter ends with conclusions reached, and suggests some recommendations for 
increasing CRs and their effectiveness in Garífuna hometowns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 12
1.1 Migration, Remittances and Development 
 
The process of globalisation has resulted in more than the transfer of goods, capital and 
information among countries; it has also meant the migration of millions of workers, 
usually from a developing to a developed country. At the beginning of the decade, 
approximately 175 million people in the world lived and worked outside their country 
of birth1. The economic gaps between the developed and the developing world and the 
shrinking and ageing population in the former, as opposed to the quickly expanding 
populations in the latter, seem to indicate that international migration is bound to 
increase in the future2. 
 
Migrants retain ties with their places of origin. While living abroad they continue to 
affect their place of origin by transferring money and by culturally and politically 
influencing their home country. The term remittances refers to the transfer of financial 
resources made by migrants. Remittances worldwide have grown steadily over the past 
30 years, and currently come to about US$100 billion a year3. Latin America and the 
Caribbean together form the region with the highest level of remittances, estimated at 
US$45.8 billion during 20054. As in the previous two years, remittances exceeded the 
combined totals of overseas aid and foreign direct investment received by the region. 
About three-quarters of the total volume of remittances sent by the 25 million Latin-
American and Caribbean-born adults living abroad came from the United States 
(USA)5. 
 
Given the significant weight of remittances in the region’s economies, multilateral 
development organisations, governments and civil society have, since the mid-1990s, 
renewed their interest in the possibility of leveraging remittances to promote 
development in the migrant-producing countries. Some argue that remittances help 
loosen the budget constraints of their recipients and allow them to increase the 
consumption of goods and services. Remittances increase human capital (when used in 
education and healthcare) and physical and financial investments (when used in 
                                                 
1 See United Nations Population Division (2002), pp.2-3. 
2 See Spataforal (2005), pp. 69. 
3 Idem 2. 
4 See Inter-American Development Bank Press Release of 22 March 2005. 
5 Idem 4. 
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residential real estate or for starting a business)6. Interventions, then, should be limited 
to facilitating the transfer of funds and regulating the commissions charged. Others 
point out that, since remittances are mostly used in consumption7, their developmental 
impact can be increased only if their use in savings and investment is promoted8. Using 
remittances as anything but income for consumption is, however, constrained by the 
economic hardships faced by remittance-receiving households, and by the context of 
their communities. Investment alternatives are limited in the migrant hometowns where 
basic infrastructure is still missing. 
 
1.2 Collective Remittances: Basic concepts  
 
Goldring (2003) identifies three types of remittance9. Family remittances are the wages 
or salaries used for consumption – money sent by migrants to support close relatives left 
behind.10 Investment remittances refer to the money used by the migrants in 
entrepreneurial rent-generating activities11, and Collective Remittances (CR) are the 
funds sent by migrant groups to finance public work projects in their communities of 
origin12.   
 
The purpose of family remittances is to maintain and perhaps improve the standard of 
living of relatives in the hometown. Their final use is a matter of private choice for the 
recipients, and they are usually spent on clothing, food and other consumption goods13. 
The purpose of investment remittances is to generate profit; they usually include the 
savings of migrants (in many cases returning migrants) used for buying houses or land, 
or in opening businesses14. The purpose of CRs is to contribute to improving living 
conditions in the hometown as a whole15. They are mostly used to finance projects 
dealing with basic health, education, public infrastructure, and for religious purposes16. 
In Central America and Mexico these projects include the construction or improvement 
                                                 
6 See Spataforal (2005), pp. 70. 
7 Surveys have shown that more than 70% of remittance receivers in Latin America use the funds to pay 
for common expenses such as food, housing and utilities. See  IADB (2004), pp. 22. 
8 See Goldring (2003), pp. 4. 
9 See Goldring (2003), pp. 8. 
10 See Goldring (2003), pp. 9-11, and compare to Durand (1994), pp. 285-286. 
11 See Goldring (2003), pp. 8, and compare to Durand (1994), pp. 287-288. 
12 See Goldring (2003), pp. 6, 8, 12-13. 
13 See Goldring (2003), pp. 8 and 10, and compare to Durand (1994), pp.285-286. 
14 See Goldring (2003), pp. 8 and compare to Durand (1994), pp. 287-288. 
15 See Goldring (2003), pp.12-13. 
16 See Orozco (2003), pp.2. 
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of roads, bridges, drainage, sports fields, halls and plazas; the instalment of 
electrification, potable water facilities and telephone lines; donation of equipment and 
support to schools, hospitals and old age homes; building or restoration of churches, and 
support for cultural and religious activities17. 
  
The three main actors that can be identified in dealing with collective remittances are 
the remitters, the intermediaries and the beneficiaries18. Hometown Associations are the 
remitters of CR. Alarcon (2003) defines a Hometown Association as “an organisation 
formed by migrants from the same locality with the purpose of transferring money and 
resources to their community of origin”19. They are generally non-sectarian, voluntary 
organisations that depend entirely on donations20. Wise characterises the HTA as a 
“collective migrant”. HTAs have more capacity than individual migrants to finance 
projects in their hometowns21.  
 
In more than one hundred Mexican HTAs studied by Orozco, the CR beneficiaries were 
rural migrant-producing villages22. Most often, HTAs work with local groups in the 
hometowns, although intermediaries of CR are sometimes specific individuals in the 
towns, such as the priest, the school principal or a relative of an HTA member. 
Sometimes HTAs organise their own committees to carry out a project in their 
hometown23. The known cases in Honduras involve committees or local community 
development organisations called Patronatos24. 
 
In Mexico and El Salvador, partnerships have been developed between the government 
and the HTAs. These partnerships are cost-sharing programs, in which the state 
leverages the funds of the HTAs, serves as a counterpart for the execution of projects, 
and assists communities in executing the projects25. 
                                                 
17 For the Mexican case see: Goldring (2000) pp. 13, Orozco (2003) and http://www.sedesol.gob.mx. For 
El Salvador, see: Orozco (2004) and http://www.fisdl.gob.sv and for Honduras see Cantor (2004) pp. 
24-25. For projects in Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua, see Andrade and Silva (2003) pp. 38. 
18 See Goldring (2003), pp. 8 and 14. 
19 See Alarcón (2000), pp. 3. 
20 See Leiken (2000), pp. 16. 
21 See Wise (2001), pp. 758-759. 
22 See Orozco (2003), pp 17-18. 
23 See Goldring (2003), pp. 12-14, Alarcón (2000), pp. 28, Orozco (2003) pp. 19-20, and Orozco and 
Welle (2005), pp. 14 and 26. 
24 See Cantor (2004), pp. 24. 
25 For a description of the Mexican 3*1 program see Orozco (2003) pp. 21-40 and 
http://www.sedesol.gob.mx, and for El Salvador’s “Unidos por la Solidaridad” program see the 
responsible ministry site www.fisdl.gob.sv/. 
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1.3 Collective Remittances and Development in the Hometowns  
 
In the United Nations 1990 Human Development report, development is defined as the 
process of enlarging people’s choices; most critical to these wide-ranging choices is the 
access to resources and goods needed for a decent standard of living, including items 
such as education and drinking water. The poor usually cannot seek substitutes for these 
resources, or cannot move to areas where they are available. Therefore, mechanisms for 
their effective delivery are essential measures for reducing poverty26. 
 
Public Goods are those which are nonexcludable and whose consumption is nonrival. 
They are nonexcludable because their benefits are available to all once they are 
provided. Nonrival means that a unit of the good can be consumed by an individual 
without reducing the consumption opportunities still available for other users of the 
same unit27. Pure public goods, for example the defence services provided by a state to 
its citizens, fully satisfy both conditions. The benefits of impure public goods are 
partially rival or partially excludable, for example highways with toll fees28. Some 
products and services are “public-like” in the sense that their provision is of public 
interest, though their characteristics might allow only a monopoly to offer them, or their 
provision may have additional and unplanned positive or negative effects. Such is the 
case with the provision of drinkable water. 
 
In migrant-producing towns, the access to pure goods and to “public-like” goods is 
often limited. The state lacks funds for financing their production, and private firms 
rarely provide them29. Collective remittances, however, can finance local groups that 
can carry out projects that provide public goods30 in the hometowns.  
 
The term “Community-Based Development” (CBD) refers to projects that actively 
include beneficiaries in their design and management. It relies on “communities” which 
organise themselves and participate in development processes31; in this case, in the 
provision of public goods. 
 
                                                 
26 See Besley and Ghatak (2004), pp. 1. 
27 Compare to Cullis and Jones (1998), pp. 46-48. 
28 Compare Sandler (1992), pp. 5-7. 
29 Compare to Cantor (2004), pp. 19. 
30 The term “Public Goods” is used throughout the study in a very broad sense - it denotes pure and 
impure public goods as well as public-like goods.  
31 See Ghazala and Vijayendra (2003), pp. 2, 8, 10 and 18. 
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CRs can be viewed as cases of CBD in which local groups in the hometowns are able to 
obtain funds from the HTAs for providing public goods. They can facilitate projects that 
would otherwise be impossible for the recipient communities to implement32. In a study 
of Mexican HTAs, CRs were sometimes equal to over 50% of the local government’s 
public works budgets, and in the case of small villages with fewer than 1,000 
inhabitants, CRs amounted to up to seven times the budget33. 
 
CBD projects are implemented in a unit called ‘community’, which refers to an 
administrative area, a tribal area, or identifies a common interest group34. Based on the 
concept of a transnational community35, which considers that migrants still exert 
cultural, social and political influence in their places of origin, it can be argued that in 
the case of CR, “community” includes both the migrants’ hometowns and their 
populations in the USA. Under such a perspective, CR projects are provided both for 
and by the beneficiaries, a particular type of self-help CBD known as community-based 
service provision36. This study, while acknowledging that social and cultural ties do 
exist in a transnational way, assumes a different perspective, and proposes the 
simultaneous existence of two communities: the migrant community with its HTAs in 
the USA, and the local community organised in groups in the hometowns. Such 
distinction allows for the study of the motivations, working mechanisms and interaction 
between these two actors. 
 
1.4 Honduran Experience with Collective Remittances 
 
As is the case with other Latin-American countries, migrants and their remittances are 
of great importance for Honduras. Puerta estimates that in 2004 between 820,000 and 
850,000 Hondurans lived in the United States37, representing approximately 12% of the 
country’s total population. For the last 6 years, the amount of remittances received in 
                                                 
32 See Orozco, Lowell, Bump and Fedewa (2004), pp. 18-19. 
33 See Orozco (2003), pp. 18 and 27. 
34 See Ghazala and Vijayendra (2003), pp. 2, 8, 10 and 18. 
35 A vast literature explores the subject of transnational communities. To cite just a few authors (some of 
whose ideas are also used in this study):  Faist, Thomas, Transnationalization in International 
Migration: Implications for the Study of Citizenship and Culture, University of Bremen; Goldring, 
Luin. (2002), Remesas familiares, remesas colectivas y desarrollo: Implicaciones sociales y políticas de 
una desagregación de remesas; Goldring (2003) See Bibliography, Andrade and Silva (2003) See 
Bibliography. 
36 See Pinto, pp. 4-7. 
37 Puerta (2005), pp.25. 
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Honduras has been greater than the combined exports of coffee and bananas, the 
country’s main traditional agricultural products. The contribution of remittances to the 
balance of payments has also been larger than those of free processing zones during the 
last 3 years. Remittances are currently, therefore, the country’s main source of foreign 
currency. In 2004 they totalled US$1,373.5 (15% of the GDP)38. 
 
The fact that there is a large Honduran migrant population living in the USA39, mostly 
concentrated in three cities40 (New York, New Orleans and Los Angeles), and the 
existence of several Honduran HTAs41, suggests a potential for these organisations to 
supply CR for financing the provision of public goods in their places of origin. The 
Honduran CR experience, however, is rather underdeveloped. Few cases are known of 
HTAs participating in the provision of public goods, and those cases that are known 
have experienced difficulties. 
 
According to Puerta: “...Until now collective remittances in Honduras are not well 
known and rarely used. Isolated cases that have occurred after Hurricane Mitch42 were 
invested without complementing funding from the public or private sector”43. This 
observation is confirmed by the lack of information on CR projects in local newspapers, 
in the country’s public offices, consular dependencies and among researchers on 
remittances belonging to the Honduran remittances research network44. 
                                                 
38 Central Bank of Honduras (2001), (2002), (2003), (2004) and (2005). 
39 In a study carried out among 2,800 Latin-American migrants in 5 American cities, around 6.7% of 
Honduran remittance senders stated that they belonged to an HTA. See Orozco, Lowell, Bump and 
Fedewa (2004), pp. 19. 
40 See Andrade and Silva (2003), pp. 13. 
41 The exact number of Honduran HTAs in the USA is not known, as no census of HTAs has been carried 
out. Taking as a reference that the Honduran Remittances Group (see footnote 44) have contact 
information for 15 HTAs, some of which are federations of  HTAs, that a study  on Garífuna migration 
(Cantor, Eric (2004)) reports 7 additional HTAs, and that the Honduran Presidential Commissioner for 
Honduran Communities Living Abroad has a directory of 45 organisations or informal groups of 
Hondurans that helped consulates during the registration process for Temporal Protection Status (TPS), 
it can be estimated that at least 40 Honduran HTAs exist.  
42 Hurricane Mitch took place in Honduras in 1998. According to the Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), around 6 000 people died and 70% of the economy was affected, 
with losses totalling approximately US$10 000 million.  
43 Puerta (2005), pp. 43. 
44 Operating since August 2001, the Remittances Group (http://migracion-remesas.rds.hn) is made up of 
researchers, private development organisations and civil society umbrella groups. Its mission is to 
debate the use of remittances as an instrument for development. In July 2003 it organised the first 
international forum, on “Remittances for Development “. The event was sponsored by the Presidential 
Secretary and the National Convergence Forum. The Honduran President was among the participants.   
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The only known cases of CR in Honduras are briefly mentioned in a study on migration 
of the Garífuna ethnic group (Cantor 2004) living in villages along the country’s 
Atlantic Coast45. 
 
1.5 Research Objective and Questions 
 
CR is an unexplored subject in Honduras - no research has been conducted, or studies 
on the subject written. Thus, this study attempts to open the discussion on the topic and 
is of an exploratory nature. It probably constitutes the first study exclusively 
concentrating on CR in Honduras. 
 
The objective of the study is to establish how collective remittances work in the 
Honduran case, and to indicate the most relevant determinants for the effective 
participation of Honduran HTAs in the provision of public goods in the hometowns.  
 
Three research questions are proposed:  
 
1. How do collective remittances work in Honduras?  
2. What are the determinants for HTAs to raise and send collective remittances to 
finance the provision of public goods in their hometowns?  
3. What are the determinants for the hometown groups to effectively manage 
collective remittances from HTAs for providing public goods in the hometowns? 
 
By exploring the factors that facilitate or impede HTAs from participating in the 
provision of public goods in the hometowns, the study could propose alternatives to 
overcome obstacles and create the conditions that facilitate the use of CR for improving 
living conditions in the hometowns. 
 
                                                 
45  See Cantor (2004), pp. 24-26 and pp. 37-38. 
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2. Theoretical Framework  
2.1 Basic Assumptions of New Institutional Economics 
 
The body of thought known as New Institutional Economics (NIE) was born as a 
criticism of the neoclassical assumptions that decision-makers in economic activities 
can obtain and process all necessary information instantly and with no cost, that they 
can anticipate the future perfectly and are therefore able to make agreements which can 
be completely monitored and enforced, and that the political, legal and other institutions 
have a neutral effect on economic outcomes46. Neoclassics explains the performance of 
an economy as a function of productivity (achieved through specialisation of labour)47. 
NIE declares that institutions matter; it considers that explaining economic activities 
only in terms of the price system or as a function of productivity is rather simplistic; 
transaction costs exist and influence the structure of institutions and the economic 
choices made by rationally limited individuals48. 
2.1.1 Explaining Behaviour: A rationally limited individual maximising his 
own interest 
 
NIE is based on methodological individualism, that is, all the outcomes should be 
explainable by individual action49. In all circumstances, individuals make their own 
choices, and pursue their personal interests or motives limited by their own constraints 
and the restrictions set by the existing institutional and organisational structures50. 
Conventionally, it is assumed that individuals try to maximise utility in a perfectly 
rational way, which means their preferences are stable and consistent and that they have 
the ability to foresee everything that might happen and evaluate all available courses of 
action51. NIE, however, introduces the idea that the preferences of decision-makers can 
be incomplete, and subject to change over time52. Because of bounded rationality, 
decision-makers are not omniscient and have problems in processing information. They 
                                                 
46 See Furubotn and Richter (2000), pp. 8-9 and Brousseau (2002), pp. 4. 
47 See Brousseau (2002), pp. 4. 
48 Compare to  Furubotn and Richter (2000),  pp. 1 and  pp.  8-9, and to Voigt and  Engerer (2002), pp. 130. 
49 See Voigt and  Engerer (2002), pp 130.  
50 See Furubotn and Richter (2000), pp. 2-3. 
51 See Kreps (1990), pp. 745. 
52 See Furubotn and Richter (2000), pp. 3. 
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cannot anticipate all contingencies that might occur. Under such conditions, rules can be 
set as guidelines on how to behave in certain circumstances53.  
2.1.2 Rules Guiding the Behaviour of Individuals: Institutions  
 
Institutions can be defined as a set of formal and informal rules and their enforcement 
arrangements54. The rule component of institutions determines who will make 
decisions, what actions are allowed or constrained, what procedures must be followed 
and what information must or must not be provided. The sanctioning component 
establishes the payoffs that will be assigned to individuals dependent on their 
behaviour55. 
 
Depending on their sanctioning component, institutions can be classified as internal or 
external. External institutions are enforced by representatives of the state, for example 
laws and ordinances. Internal institutions are rules whose non-compliance is sanctioned 
by members of society. Four different kinds of internal institutions exist. Conventions 
are self-enforcing, because no-one is better off for deviating unilaterally from them. 
Ethical rules are the internally enforced institutions. Individuals internalise them as the 
“right thing to do”. Customs are enforced by non-organised societal control. Damage to 
the reputations of noncompliant individuals is an example of such sanctioning. Lastly, 
private rules are enforced by organised third parties, such as private courts of 
arbitration56. 
 
The purpose of institutions is to direct individual behaviour in a particular way, and by 
doing so they give structure to activities and therefore reduce uncertainty57. Voigt and 
Engerer consider that the role of institutions is:  
 
“To reduce uncertainty, extend time horizons, induce people to specialise and to try greater 
division of labour, and in short, make everyone better”58 
 
Institutions and the people using them are called organisations59. Arrow adds that an 
organisation is:  “...a group of individuals seeking to achieve some common goals, or in 
                                                 
53 See Voigt and Engerer (2002), pp. 131. 
54 See Schmoller (1900), pp. 61. 
55 See Ostrom (1990), pp. 51. 
56 See Voigt and Engerer (2002), pp. 133. 
57 See North (1994), pp. 4. 
58 See Voigt and Engerer (2002), pp. 131. 
59 See Furubotn and Richter (2000), pp. 7. 
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different language, to maximise an objective function”60. Setting and operating 
institutions and organisations and guaranteeing obedience to their rules requires the use 
of resources. These costs are broadly referred as Transaction Costs.  
2.1.3 The Cornerstone of NIE: Transaction Costs 
 
Transaction Costs (TAC) are both the costs attached to using the market and the costs of 
administrative coordination within a hierarchical organisation61. Since NIE considers 
that transacting individuals have human limitations, bounded rationality and a tendency 
to make mistakes, they will always be inefficient compared with the predicted decision-
makers of neoclassical theory. It is because of these characteristics of the individuals 
making decisions that TAC are universally encountered62. 
 
TAC were first introduced to economic thought by Ronald Coase, who argued that: 
 
“In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that one wishes to 
deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal with and in what terms, to conduct 
negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract and to undertake the inspection 
needed to make sure that the terms of a contract are being observed.”63 
 
The TAC to which Coase refers are classified as Market TAC and they include search 
and information costs, bargaining and decision costs and supervision and enforcement 
costs. The TAC of setting up, maintaining or changing an institutional design are 
classified as Managerial TAC. A third class refers to the Political TAC of setting up and 
running the institutional framework of a policy. 
 
If individuals perceive that the TAC are prohibitively high, they will decide not to 
transact. Since the higher TAC are, the fewer exchanges will take place, NIE considers 
that TAC are critical for the development of an economy64. The introduction of TAC 
theory reoriented established thinking about economic processes, and marks the 
departure point of NIE from neoclassical economics. The existence of positive TAC 
provides the reasons why institutions should be included as variables in the economic 
model. Institutional structures affect both transaction costs and individual incentives, 
and hence, economic performance65. When considering the fact that institutions affect 
                                                 
60 Arrow (1970), pp. 224. 
61 See Chandler (1977), pp. 490 and Furubotn and Richter (2000), pp. 8. 
62 See Furubotn and Richter (2000) pp. 39. 
63 See Coase (1960), pp.15. 
64 Compare to Voigt and Engerer (2002), pp. 131. 
65 See Furubotn and Richter (2000), pp. 1 and 10. 
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economic outcome, then they are treated as endogenous variables. When institutional 
arrangements are viewed as individuals’ responses to reduce TAC, and when the 
reduction of TAC explains why one institutional arrangement works better than another, 
then institutions are treated as endogenous variables66. 
2.1.4 NIE and Contracts: The Economic Theory of Contracts 
 
In economics, contracts are viewed as agreements (regardless of their legal status) 
between individuals, who recognise a mutual interest in changing their behaviour. These 
agreements may include the actions each contracting party is to take, any payments that 
might flow from one another, the rules and procedures they will use to decide matters in 
the future, and the behaviour that each might expect from the others67. Contracting 
parties will participate in the agreement if they find it advantageous individually. They 
can establish a contract without writing it down or articulating it explicitly - such 
contracts are designated “Implicit Contracts”68. Contracts occur not only in the market, 
but also within organisations. Whereas neoclassical economics saw the firm as a 
production set, from the standpoint of NIE the firm is seen as a nexus of contracts69. 
 
NIE, and particularly the subsection known as the economic theory of contracts, 
incorporates the concepts of asymmetry of information, imperfect foresight and 
opportunistic behaviour in the study of contracts70. Asymmetry of information refers to 
one of the contracting parties possessing more information71 or having different 
knowledge72 to another. Imperfect foresight refers to the bounded rationality of 
individuals in predicting the future; this means that it would be impossible to include in 
the contract all the future contingencies that might exist73. Given that contracting 
individuals might be opportunistic, both asymmetry of information and their 
opportunism may generate problems. An individual is said to behave opportunistically 
if they disguise preferences, distort data or deliberately confuse issues in order to gain 
personal benefit74. Because contracting parties are aware of the possibility of 
                                                 
66 Compare to Voigt and Engerer (2002), pp. 135. 
67 See Milgrom and Roberts (1992), pp. 127. 
68 See Furubotn and Richter (2000), pp. 156-157. 
69 See Fama (1980), pp.288, and Furubotn and Richter (2000), pp. 152. 
70 See Furubotn and Richter (2000), pp. 146. 
71 See Furubotn and Richter (2000), pp. 4. 
72 See Stiglitz (2003), pp. 15. 
73 See Furubotn and Richter (2000), pp. 179-180. 
74 See Furubotn and Richter (2000), pp. 4. 
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opportunistic behaviour, ex-ante75 measures are designed to guard against ex-post 
opportunism76. The asymmetries of information, and imperfect foresight given the 
possibility of opportunistic behaviour, are sources of TAC.  
 
Transaction Costs result in both information and contract enforcement problems. In 
terms of contracts, market TAC can be classified into77: 
 
• The Costs of Preparing the Contract (Ex-ante Search and Information Costs): 
are the costs involved in searching for a suitable party with whom to deal 
(incurred by activities such as advertising, or by creating organisations such as 
the stock exchange); the costs of communicating among the prospective parties 
to the exchange (for example telephone and fax costs) and of gathering 
information about the prices demanded by different suppliers of the goods; and 
the costs involved in testing and quality control78. 
 
• The Cost of Concluding the Contract (Bargaining and Decision Costs): 
bargaining costs include costs of legal advice or the time taken during writing of 
a contract when the parties bargain its provisions. Decision costs are incurred 
when making gathered information available, for example the costs of advisors 
and of reaching decisions in groups79. 
 
• The Costs of Monitoring and Enforcing the Contractual Obligations 
(Supervision and Enforcement Costs, or Search and Information Costs): are 
those incurred in monitoring the agreed deliveries, measuring the valuable 
attributes of the exchanged goods, and in protecting rights and enforcing 
contractual provisions.80 
 
The theoretical approaches developed to deal with these problems can be classified into 
three different groupings81:   
                                                 
75 The term ex-ante refers to the time before the contract takes place, whereas ex-post denotes the time 
after the contract has been established. 
76 See Furubotn and Richter (2000), pp. 169. 
77 See Coase (1960), pp. 15, quoted in pp. 17 section 2.1.3 The Cornerstone of NIE: TAC. 
78 See Furubotn and Richter (2000), pp. 44. 
79 See Furubotn and Richter (2000), pp. 45. 
80 Idem 79. 
81 See Furubotn and Richter (2000), pp. 146, and compare with Brosseau and Galachart (2002), pp. 8-9. 
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• The Implicit Contract Theory is concerned with the difficulties that arise when 
agreements are not enforceable, or are not perfectly enforceable82. 
• The Incomplete Contract Theory is concerned with the post-contractual 
difficulties that arise because of specific investments83 made by contracting 
parties, and the difficulties of third parties in verifying the execution of 
contractual obligations84. 
• The Agency Contract Theory (or Principal-Agent Approach) is concerned with 
the problem of asymmetric information possessed by the parties to the 
contract85. 
2.2 The Principal-Agent Approach 
 
An agency relation is one in which two economic actors with asymmetric information, 
known as the principal and the agent, are considered86. The principal engages the agent 
to perform some service on their behalf. To facilitate the achievement of the activity 
they delegate some decision-making authority to the agent. The principal offers a 
contract that the agent can accept or reject, but since the former knows or can observe 
less than the latter, the latter may behave opportunistically. Depending on whether the 
parties are asymmetrically informed before (and up to) the establishment of the contract, 
or thereafter, two kinds of agency relations are studied: Adverse Selection refers to 
asymmetric information distribution occurring ex-ante, and Moral Hazard to 
distribution occurring ex-post. 
2.2.1 Adverse Selection & The Lemons Principle 
 
Before the contract is established, the principal needs to select the agent with whom 
they will transact. Not all the possible agents are equally qualified for performing the 
tasks that the contract requires. The principal needs to select an agent possessing the 
required characteristics, but cannot observe the qualities of the individual agents fully 
before the contract is concluded, therefore information is asymmetric ex-ante. An 
unqualified agent can take advantage of this situation ex-ante to misrepresent his 
qualifications in order to be selected and establish a contract with the principal. Pre-
                                                 
82 See Furubotn and Richter (2000), pp. 146. 
83 Specific Investments refer to investments that generate higher returns in a particular employment than 
elsewhere, for example the purchase of tools that have highly specialised uses. See Furubotn and 
Richter (2000), pp. 128. 
84 Idem 82. 
85 Idem 82. 
86 See Furubotn and Richter (2000), pp. 148. 
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contractual opportunistic behaviour under asymmetric information conditions leads to 
the selection of an inappropriate agent, a situation known as Adverse Selection87. 
 
Akerlof (1970) illustrated the effects of adverse selection using the case of a used car 
market. Generally, the sellers of used cars have more knowledge about the quality of the 
cars they are selling than the buyers do. Since buyers cannot tell the difference between 
a good or a bad car (between peaches and lemons), they are not willing to pay more 
than the average price, which is lower than the price acceptable to a “high quality” 
seller. Sellers have no incentive to provide good quality goods, since they can only sell 
them at a low quality price. As a result there tends to be a reduction in the average 
quality of goods in the market. Akerlof (pp. 489) concludes: 
  
“For most cars traded will be the ‘lemons’, and good cars may not be traded at all. The ‘bad’ 
cars tend to drive out the good.” 
  
The Lemons Principle shows how adverse selection can lead to a non-existent market.  
 
Similar conclusions can also be reached when considering TAC. To prevent ex-post 
opportunism, the principal uses resources ex-ante to verify the characteristics of the 
possible agents. These costs are TAC, specifically information and search costs. 
However, if the principal perceives that the information and search costs are too high, 
they might decide not to transact at all, and no contract would be established. To 
overcome adverse selection, two mechanisms exist: screening and signalling. In the 
former the principal takes the initiative, while the latter is performed by the agent. 
• Screening 
Screening describes the situation that exists when the party lacking information 
proposes a menu of contracts to the informed party. By selecting one of the contracts, 
the agent reveals their true quality and the principal gains valuable information88. For 
example, a lazy worker might choose a contract where he or she is paid by the hour, 
whereas an efficient worker might prefer to be paid for task completion. The agents 
effectively select themselves. 
                                                 
87 See Furubotn and Richter (2000), pp. 180. 
88 See Kreps (1990), pp. 651. 
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• Signalling 
Signalling refers to the fact that the informed contracting party can undertake activities 
that signal their qualities89. Signals are attributes that are observable but alterable in an 
individual90. For example, an educational degree can be used by an employee (an agent) 
to signal his or her capacity to their employer (the principal). 
 
2.2.2. Moral Hazards: Hidden Actions or Information  
 
After the contract is established, asymmetric information can occur in one of two ways. 
First, the agent’s action might be not directly observable by the principal. This, for 
example, may include the effort that a worker dedicates to the tasks assigned by the 
principal. The second way occurs when the agent has made some observations that the 
principal has not made, for example the information known by a subordinate that is not 
available to management91. The first is a case of hidden action, and the second is one of 
hidden information92.  
 
The agent might not only feel tempted to behave opportunistically; they may also 
encounter two circumstances that facilitate such behaviour. Firstly, it may be too costly 
for the principal to directly monitor the agent’s actions, or acquire full knowledge of the 
agent’s personal observational information directly. Secondly, both the principal and the 
agent are aware that outcomes are determined not only by the agent’s action, but also by 
external and uncontrollable events. As a result, the agent can always blame forces 
beyond their control for any poor result93.  
 
Whereas adverse selection was a source of search and information costs, moral hazards 
are a source of monitoring costs. If monitoring costs are high than violations to 
contracts are inevitable94, and contracts will not be implemented as originally agreed. 
  
                                                 
89 See Furubotn and Richter (2000), pp. 221. 
90 See Spence (1973), pp. 357. 
91 See Furubotn and Richter (2000), pp. 148. 
92 See Arrow (1985), pp. 38. 
93 See Furubotn and Richter (2000), pp. 180. 
94 See Furubotn and Richter (2000), pp. 45. 
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Monitoring and verifying are possible solutions to moral hazard problems, as they 
increase information about the actions of agents. This in turn can be used as a basis for 
rewarding good (or penalising bad) behaviour95.  
2.2.3. Incentive Compatibility: Agents pursuing their own interests while 
they serve those of the principal 
 
Finally, the Principal-Agent approach considers the compatibility of incentives; which 
means that the agent, when pursuing their own interests, also serves those of the 
principal. The incentives driving the behaviour of individuals include not only 
motivating elements or the possibility of reward, but also constraining elements. In the 
case of moral hazard, compatibility is achieved by offering the agent an economic 
incentive when they reveal information to the principal or behave in a way that serves 
the principal’s interests - for example, offering a bonus to the managers of a firm when 
profits increase. In the case of adverse selection, the contract offered to the agent is 
constraining. The agent would select it only if he or she possesses the characteristics or 
abilities required by the contract96. 
2.3 An Institutional Perspective of CR with a Principal-Agent 
Approach  
 
In the provision of public goods through CR, two groups are present: HTAs in the USA 
and the CBOs in the hometowns. Groups in both countries can be conceptualised as 
organisations. Both of them are composed of people working together under a system 
of rules, which are the HTA statutes and the internal institutions present in the migrant 
community and in the hometowns. Informal social institutions, as well as possible 
private gains, perhaps in the form of prestige, might create the incentives for migrants in 
the USA to establish a group for helping their hometown. The same is true for the 
Patronatos or other CBOs in the hometowns. However, members spend time and effort 
in the working meetings, in fundraising, and in participating in the different activities. 
Deciding to finance a particular project in the hometowns might be perceived by HTA 
members as a task consuming too much time or effort. 
 
An agreement or Contract is established between the HTAs and the hometowns 
organised in Patronatos or another form of CBO. The HTAs agree to provide the funds, 
                                                 
95 Compare to Milgrom and Roberts (1992), pp. 186. 
96 Compare to Furubotn and Richter (2000), pp. 188 and 183. 
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and the CBOs agree to use them in the execution of projects for the provision of public 
goods. Of the two contracting parties, the HTAs possess less information concerning the 
hometown’s specific needs than the local inhabitants. They must decide to which group 
they will entrust CR. CBOs possess more information about a town’s needs and the 
projects that could be executed than the HTAs do. Once the contract is established and 
CR is transferred to the towns, the HTAs remain in the USA and cannot directly 
observe the actions of the local CBOs. Local CBOs, unlike the HTAs, are able to 
supervise the projects’ execution and are more informed as to their progress. Since it is 
most likely that the contracts are of an unwritten nature, internal institutions should 
provide the enforcement mechanisms for each party to fulfil its agreed role. 
 
From an NIE perspective, with a Principal-Agent approach, the research question can be 
expressed as:  
 
1. Which existing institutions explain the establishment and enforcement of 
contracts between the HTAs and their counterpart CBOs in the hometowns for 
supplying CR to be used in the provision of public goods? 
2. Is the level of information-search cost for finding a reliable and capable partner 
in the hometowns preventing HTAs from establishing a contract for supplying 
CR to be used in the provision of public goods? 
3. Is the level of monitoring cost during the transacting of CR reducing the 
effectiveness of contracts for supplying CR to be used in the provision of public 
goods?  
 
Search and information costs are present ex-ante during the contract establishment 
phase of the provision of public goods through CR. Resources are used in 
communicating and in establishing the initial contact between the HTA and CBOs. 
HTAs will seek mechanisms to avoid working with local CBOs that are not capable of 
managing the funds and executing the planned work. HTAs can use screening to decide 
if the Patronato or other CBO in the community is adequate for the purpose. CBOs in 
the community can signal the HTAs that they are qualified and trustable enough to 
undertake the project. They might convince the HTAs they are an adequate partner by 
demonstrating their experience in similar projects, or acquiring a formal legal status. 
Resources are also used in choosing on which specific project the funds will be used, 
but again the CBO can signal possible financing opportunities for the HTA. If this 
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initial phase concludes successfully, then the HTAs agree to provide funds to the 
hometowns for accessing public goods. 
 
During the contract’s implementation and enforcement phase, monitoring costs are 
incurred. Time and effort is required for monitoring whether the local CBOs manage the 
CR properly. For example, bills can be verified in the USA, and the HTA´s directors 
can travel to the hometowns to verify the use of CR. The HTA wants to avoid the hiding 
of opportunistic actions by the CBOs, such as funds being used for other purposes than 
what was agreed, or even being stolen. Since the HTA is not present during the 
execution of work, they have to trust that the observations that the local CBOs share 
with them concerning the progress of the projects are true.   
 
Theory predicts that the information and search costs might be so high that the HTAs 
decide not to provide public goods, or that the monitoring costs are so high that 
violation of contracts is unavoidable. 
 
Figure 1 (An Institutional Perspective of Collective Remittances with a Principal-Agent 
Approach) illustrates CR from an institutional perspective. The supply of CR for 
financing projects providing public goods, and the effectiveness of these projects, are 
the dependent variables explained. The existing information-search and monitoring 
costs are the independent variables. The goods being “transacted” are CR for the 
provision of public goods. The HTAs in USA are the principal; they supply funds or CR 
for carrying out projects whose aim is to provide public goods in the hometowns. The 
hometowns organised in Patronatos or other CBOs are the agents; they manage CR used 
for executing these projects.  
 
Existing institutions provide the framework to understand how collective remittances 
work. They explain why migrants decide to send CR, why local CBOs would be 
interested in working with HTAs, why agreements are reached between these two 
groups; and they might also provide the means for such agreements to be enforced.  
However, before a contract of CR is established, adverse selection problems may arise. 
The search and information costs are the first two sets of independent variables 
determining the dependent variable that is provision of public goods through CR. No 
relation will be established if the HTAs perceive it to be too costly to contact and select 
an appropriate local CBO to manage the CR, or to select the project to be financed.  
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Once the contract is established, moral hazard problems may occur. The monitoring 
costs are the second set of independent variables that determine the dependent variable 
that is effectiveness in the provision of public goods through CR. Effectiveness is 
defined as the completion of the project as was planned when it was originally started. 
If monitoring the use of CR or obtaining information about the state of the project 
results is extremely costly for the HTA, the HTA will not be able to prevent CBOs from 
violating the contract. When the search-information and monitoring costs present are 
not prohibitively high for the HTAs, then an effective provision of public goods via CR 
will occur.  
Figure 1: An Institutional Perspective of Collective 
Remittances with a Principal-Agent Approach 
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2.4 Theoretical Hypotheses 
 
There are two hypotheses to be tested: 
 
Hypothesis No. 1 
Adverse selection in the interaction between the HTAs and the Hometowns CBOs leads 
to no provision of public goods via collective remittances. 
 
Hypothesis No. 2 
Moral hazard in the transacting of CR between HTAs and the hometown CBOs leads to 
an ineffective provision of public goods via collective remittances. 
 
Sub-hypotheses 
Sub-hypothesis No. 1 
Search-Information Costs   
1. High search-information costs for selecting a capable and trustworthy local CBO 
to manage CR and execute projects prevents HTAs from supplying CR for the 
provision of public goods in their hometowns. 
2. High search-information costs for selecting the project to be financed by HTAs 
prevents HTAs from supplying CR for the provision of public goods in their 
hometowns. 
 
Sub-hypothesis No. 2 
Monitoring Costs  
1. In a contract for supplying CR to finance projects that provide public goods, 
high monitoring costs relating to the disbursement of CR may prevent sufficient 
monitoring by the HTA, and therefore result in an unsuccessful project. 
2. In a contract for supplying CR to finance projects that provide public goods, 
high monitoring costs relating to the project’s execution may prevent the HTA 
from overseeing the project sufficiently, and therefore result in an unsuccessful 
project. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Data Needs and Indicators 
 
Due to the exploratory nature of this study, two types of data are required. On one hand 
data is needed to describe, from an institutional point of view, how CRs are currently 
working in the Garífuna Case; and on the other hand, data is needed to test the 
hypothesized factors that prevent CR distribution from occurring, or that reduce its 
effectiveness. 
3.1.1 Descriptive data of the CRs working mechanisms  
 
The first set of data is necessary to describe the actors involved in the transacting of 
collective remittances, and the characteristics of the established contract. In order to 
understand the behaviour of the contracting parties, their motives and some of their 
organisational aspects are considered. 
• The Principal`s (HTAs) Motives can only be understood as a function of the motives 
of the individual members of the organisation. Therefore, this indicator establishes 
the incentives for a migrant to cooperate with the hometowns and to join an HTA. 
Furthermore, the stated goals of the organisation are also considered and compared   
to those of its members. 
• The Organisational Structure creates constraints on individual members’ behaviour.  
It is related to the rules regulating how decisions will be taken within the HTAs. 
This structure might determine how decisions are taken concerning the use of CR in 
the hometowns. 
• Fund-raising Activities define the financial scope of the organisation. These 
activities are the means through which an HTA obtains the CR that it later transacts 
with the CBOs. They define the size of the projects they might be able to finance. 
• The Workload of decision-making and fund-raising establishes whether the level of 
difficulty of these activities is perceived to be so high by the members that they 
would rather not participate in them. Even though fund-raising and decision-making 
rules exist to facilitate the functioning of the HTA, they can also represent a 
constraint if they are viewed as requiring too much effort from members. 
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• Local CBOs are analysed in a similar way to the HTAs, based on methodological 
individualism - their motives are considered to be a function of the individual 
members’ motives. Their structure limits their scope of action but can also 
demotivate individuals when too much effort is seen to be necessary. 
• The Contract of CR indicates what institutions are behind the existence of CR, how 
the compromises between the HTAs and the CBOs are enforced, and what the role 
of each party is. 
 
Table 1 (Indicators for an institutional description of collective remittances) summarises 
the indicators used to describe how CR remittances work in Honduras. 
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Table 1:  Indicators for an Institutional Description of Collective Remittances  
Indicator Description & Measurement 
IA. HTAs  
IA1. HTA motives 
 
* Reasons why a migrant should contribute to hometown well-
being by financing the provision of public goods: Open Answer 
* Reasons why a migrant should join an HTA: Open Answer 
* Reasons why an HTA is created: Open Answer 
* HTA’s  list of goals: Open Answer  
* Reasons why an HTA should send CR to a CBO for providing 
public goods: Open Answer 
IA2. Organisational structure and 
decision-making procedures 
 
* Description of Organisational Structure: Open Answer 
* Description Board Members Election Procedure: Open Answer 
* Description Decision making: Open Answer 
IA3. Fund-raising mechanisms for 
CR 
* Description of: Open Answer 
IA4. Workload in decision-
making 
* Perceived level of difficulty: easy/fair/difficult/too difficult 
IA5. Workload in fund-raising for 
CR 
*Perceived level of difficulty: easy/fair/difficult/too difficult 
IB. CBOs   
IB1.  CBO motives * Reasons why an inhabitant should join a Patronato or other 
CBO: Open Answer  
* Reasons why a CBO is created: Open Answer 
* CBO ´s list of goals: Open Answer  
* Reasons why a hometown’s CBO should cooperate with an 
HTA in a project for the provision of public goods: Open 
Answer 
IB2. Organisational structure and 
Decision-making process 
 
* Description of organisational structure: Open Answer 
* Description of board member election procedure: Open Answer 
* Description of decision-making: Open Answer 
IB Workload in decision-making *Perceived level of difficulty: easy/fair/difficult/too difficult 
The Contract of Collective Remittances between HTAs and local CBOs 
IC. CR Contract  * Description of the contract established: Open Answer describing 
the type of agreement reached 
* Role of the contracting parts: Open Answer 
* Sanctions for members of an HTA that doesn’t fulfil its promise 
to provide CR as agreed with the CBOs: Open Answer 
* Sanctions for members of an CBO that doesn’t fulfil its promise 
to use CR as agreed with the HTA: Open Answer 
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3.1.2 Explicative Data 
 
The second sets of variables needed are those that explain the causal relationship 
between the costs associated with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information and 
the existence and effectiveness of CR.  
• Variables 
In order to verify the proposed hypothesis, two sets of variables are considered. The 
independent variables are the costs associated with the adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems. 
 
Search and Information Costs (SIC):  TAC related to adverse selection that occur in 
the interaction between the HTAs and the hometown CBOs, which are present previous 
to the establishment of a contract to supply CR for the execution of projects providing 
public goods in the hometowns. 
Monitoring Costs (MC): TAC related to moral hazard that occur in the interaction 
between the HTAs and the hometown CBOs, which are present during the 
implementation and enforcement of the established contract for supplying CR for the 
provision of public goods in the hometowns. 
 
The independent variables explain the final outcome in the Garífuna Towns, that is, 
whether projects financed with CR are started, and once started, whether they are 
completed. 
 
The provision of public goods via CR (PPG): The establishment of a contract between 
the HTA and the hometown’s CBO in which the former agrees to supply CR and the 
latter agrees to use the financial resources in a project for the provision of public goods 
in the hometown. 
The effectiveness of the provision of public goods via CR (EPPG): A project is 
considered effective if it is completed as initially agreed or planned, that is, the public 
good is provided in the hometown. 
• Adverse Selection Indicators (AS) 
These are factors related to the lack of CR due to ex-ante asymmetric information. They 
can determine whether the market will break down. 
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o Screening by the Principal (AS1A) refers to the criteria the HTAs use in 
selecting CBOs and projects to be financed, and to all the activities they 
carry out in order to prevent adverse selection.  
o The Signalling (AS1B) activities initiated by the local CBOs are a second set 
of variables. They include all those actions that the CBOs carry out to 
convince HTAs to supply them with funds for their projects and thus also 
overcome adverse selection. 
o Information and Search Costs (AS1C) are a measure of the members of the 
HTA’s perception of the level of difficulty in contacting and communicating 
with the local CBOs. The market will break down if they are perceived to be 
too high. This means if decision-makers consider it too difficult to find an 
adequate partner, then they would rather not start looking for one at all. 
o Project Selection (AS2A) is also an activity where information asymmetry 
exists. The local CBOs possess more information concerning town needs 
than the HTAs, therefore activities need to be carried out by the HTAs in 
order to obtain information regarding the “investment” opportunities 
available for CR. Discriminating one project from another also takes effort. 
o  Search and Information Costs (AS2B) will also occur in relation to the 
activities necessary to choose a project.  Here, the perception of the decision-
makers concerning the difficulty of these activities is also used to determine 
whether the search and information costs are too high and will therefore 
demotivate decision makers from selecting any project at all. 
 
Table 2 (Adverse selection indicators) presents the ex-ante factors that are related to 
adverse selection, and their effect on the establishment of a CR contract. 
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Table 2: Adverse Selection Problem Indicators 
Hypothesis Indicator Description & Measurement 
1. High search-information 
costs for selecting a 
capable and trustworthy 
local CBO to manage CR 
and execute the projects 
prevent HTAs from 
supplying CR for the 
provision of public goods 
in their hometowns. 
 
AS1A. Screening mechanisms 
for selecting adequate 
hometown CBOs 
* Existence of defined and known 
selection criteria: Yes/No 
* Description of selection criteria: Open 
Answer 
* Description of selection process: Open 
Answer 
AS1B. Signalling mechanisms 
from the hometown CBOs 
* Existence of mechanisms for demon-
strating to the HTAs the hometown 
CBOs’ capacity for undertaking the 
project: Yes/No 
* Description of signalling mechanisms: 
Open Answer 
AS1C. Search and Information 
Costs 
* Perceived level of difficulty: 
easy/fair/difficult/too difficult 
2. High search-information 
costs for selecting the 
project to be financed by 
HTAs prevent HTAs 
from supplying CR for 
the provision of public 
goods in their 
hometowns. 
AS2A Project Selection 
Process 
* Existence of projects list developed by 
hometown CBOs: Yes/No 
* Existence of defined and known 
selection criteria: Yes/No 
* Description of selection criteria: Open 
Answer 
* Existence of defined and known 
selection procedure: Yes/No 
* Description of selection process: Open 
Answer 
AS2B. Search and Information 
Costs 
* Perceived level of difficulty 
easy/fair/difficult/too difficult 
 
• Moral Hazard Indicators (MH) 
Are those that are related to the impossibility of enforcing the contract and therefore of 
assuring its effectiveness. 
 
o Process of supplying CR (MH1A): Since the contract of CR involves sending 
money to the local CBOs, the transferring mechanism used can open the way 
for opportunism to occur in the form of hidden actions. A portion of the 
money sent by the HTA might not reach the CBOs. If the transferring 
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mechanism itself is too costly or complicated, then resources might be used 
up in the process. The CR might not be raised or sent when most needed, 
preventing the project ending as planned. 
o Monitoring Costs related to the process of supplying CR (MH1B) are the 
costs that should be incurred in order to prevent hidden opportunistic action 
during the disbursement of CR. If it is perceived as too high, no monitoring 
will be put in place concerning the transfer of CR, and the hidden actions 
will result in the projects not ending as planned. 
o Monitoring Mechanisms (MH2A): these refer to the mechanisms put in place 
to control the execution of the works financed. Since the HTAs cannot 
directly verify the work’s execution, they have to rely on the information 
provided by the partner CBOs. Hidden information means that the HTAs 
will not reveal the truth about project progress or its real needs. 
o Monitoring Costs (MH2B) related to monitoring mechanisms are the TAC of 
monitoring the execution of the work. They are necessary to prevent 
information being hidden. If HTAs perceive that it is too costly to monitor 
the execution of the work done by the local CBOs, no monitoring 
mechanism will be put in place, and it becomes possible to hide information. 
If moral hazard occurs then the projects may be executed differently to what 
was planned. If they are not concluded as agreed, then ineffectiveness has 
occurred. 
 
 
Table 3 (Moral Hazard Indicators) presents the ex-post factors that are related to moral 
hazard problems and their effect on the effectiveness of the projects financed by CR. 
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Table 3: Moral Hazard Problem Indicators 
Hypotheses Indicator Description & Measurement 
1. High monitoring costs 
prevent projects from 
being completed. 
MH1A. Process of supplying CR * Description of the process of 
supplying CR to the hometown 
CBOs: Open Answer 
MH1B. Monitoring costs  
 
* Perceived level of difficulty 
easy/fair/difficult/too difficult   
2. High monitoring costs in 
the CR finance projects 
prevent them from being 
completed. 
MH2A.Monitoring Mechanisms 
 
* Description of reporting 
mechanism from the hometown 
CBOs to the HTA: Open Answer 
 
MH2B.  Monitoring Costs 
 
* Perceived level of difficulty 
easy/fair/difficult/too difficult   
 
3.2 Case Study Description 
 
In order to achieve its goals the study required the analysis of specific migrant 
communities in the USA and their corresponding hometowns. The Garífuna 
communities living on the Honduran Caribbean coast provide the necessary conditions. 
  
The Garífuna are an ethnic group descended from marooned African slaves and 
indigenous peoples of the Caribbean. After they suffered defeat at the hands of the 
British, alongside the French, in a series of 18th-century colonial wars, the remaining 
Garífuna were banished from their home island of St. Vincent in 1797.  Exiled to the 
island of Roatan, they settled the coasts of Belize, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Honduras.  
 
Garífuna migration has a much longer trajectory than that of the rest of the Honduran 
population. Its history dates back to World War II, when the US government recruited 
them for jobs left vacant by workers serving in the army. Additional migration took 
place through the American-owned banana plantation companies working in Honduras. 
As economic conditions worsened in Honduras, starting with the banana company 
strikes in the 1950s and resulting in the eventual withdrawal of these employers, 
migration intensified. The economic shocks of the 1970s drove increasing numbers of 
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Garífuna to migrate97. By the 1970s, Nancie Gonzalez concludes that “migration to 
New York has become an essential part of the Garífuna culture without which they 
could not now survive98”. 
 
The Garífuna population in Honduras is concentrated along the Caribbean coast in 36 
towns, called Morenales. The largest contingent of Garífuna is thought to reside in 21 
communities in the department of Colón. In the USA, migrants predominantly live in 
New York City (NYC). The Garífuna population in Honduras is estimated to be close to 
200 000, or less than 5% of the country’s total population. It is estimated that around 
100 000 Garífuna live in the USA99. 
 
Most of the CR experiences in Honduras are to be found among Garífuna HTAs. 
According to Andrade:  “At least since the ‘60s, Garífuna transmigrants in the US have 
formed hometown associations concerned with the development of their villages 
through the building of infrastructure, mutual aid societies and the celebration of 
Garífuna culture”100. For this reason, and because both the demand and supply side 
actors of CR are concentrated in a clearly defined geographical area, the study focused 
on this particular ethnic community. Four Garífuna towns (Limón, Santa Fé, 
Sangrelaya, Santa Rosa de Aguan) and their corresponding HTAs in the USA 
(Organisation of Ladies from Limón in NYC, Ladies from Santa Fé in NYC, 
Organisation for the Development of Aguan, and United Sangrelayas in NYC (SUNY)) 
were studied. Table 4 presents the general characteristics of the sample hometowns. All 
the hometowns belong to the Department of Colón, located on Honduras´ Caribbean 
Coast. Each town belongs to a different municipality, which is the smallest political 
division in the country. 
                                                 
97 Cantor, Eric (2004), pp. 18.  
98 Gonzalez, Nancie (1979), pp. 261. 
99 Cantor, Eric(2004), pp. 16 and 18.  
100 Andrade and Silva (2003), pp. 8. 
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Table 4: Characteristics of Sample Hometowns 
Municipality HDI101
*a 
Number of 
households
102 
Towns 
Visited 
Estimated 
population 
Estimated 
number of 
households 
Estimated % 
of 
households 
receiving 
remittances 
Limón 0.657 1,592 Limón 8,000 1,300 70-80% 
Santa Fé 0.665 1,261 Santa Fé 4,500 780 70-75% 
Iriona 0.694 3,170 Sangrela
ya 
1,500 300 80-85% 
Santa Rosa 
de Aguan 
0.659 843 (Santa 
Rosa de 
Aguan)
103  
3,500 750 80-85% 
Source:  UNDP Human Development Report on Honduras, 2003, Cantor (2003), pp.17, & 
estimates from interviewed informants. 
 
*a: Honduras  HDI was 0.657 in 2003.
 
3.3 Data Collection and Analysis 
 
The research was conducted during the months of August and September. Four weeks 
were spent in New York City, USA and 4 weeks in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, and in three 
sample hometowns:  Limón, Santa Fé and Sangrelaya (see Appendix A2: Timetable of 
Field Research). Face-to-face interviews were carried out by the researcher using two 
different interview guidelines (see Appendix A1: Interview Guidelines) for two types of 
informants: decision-makers in the HTA, and in hometown CBOs which have worked 
or are currently working with the interviewed HTAs (see List of Informants). Interviews 
allowed the informants to express their opinions in a conversational situation, rather 
than answering a fixed-structure questionnaire. Due to the exploratory nature of the 
study, and the limited number of informants, the research concentrated on qualitative 
data such as the informants’ anecdotes of their personal experiences and their own 
perceptions. Interview guidelines included mostly open questions. Open questions 
provided greater insight of the factors that are behind the provision of public goods via 
                                                 
101 UNDP Human Development Report on Honduras, 2003, p. 225. 
102 Honduran National Institute of Statistics Census, 2001. 
103 Santa Rosa de Aguan Town was not visited during the field research; however on the return trip to 
NYC, board members of the Santa Rosa de Aguan´s HTA were interviewed. (see  Appendix A2: 
Timetable of Field Research). 
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CR in the Garífuna case, and they highlighted the existence of previously unpredicted 
factors. A text analysis of the open questions and answers identified common categories 
and concepts, in order to verify the proposed hypotheses. Measurement of the level of 
search-information and monitoring costs is based on the informants’ perceptions. Those 
questions reliant on perception used a Likert scale to produce ordinal variables. The 
research was also enriched with the views of experts from the Remesas Network and the 
Honduran Commissioner for Honduran Communities living abroad, during meetings 
carried out in Honduras, and further documents on CR in the research network were 
revised.  
 
3.4 Limitations of the Study 
 
 
1. Local governments in Honduras are not present as an intermediary actor 
between the hometowns’ inhabitants and the HTAs. The research thus 
concentrated on the hometowns organised in Patronatos or other CBOs. To 
evaluate whether the lack of such partnership explains the CR 
underdevelopment in the country in relation to other countries where such 
partnerships exist would call for a comparative analysis with another country 
such as El Salvador or Mexico - such analysis is beyond the scope of this study.  
 
2. The research was limited by time and resources available, as well as access to 
appropriate informants. In New York the Garífuna communities, unlike other 
migrant communities, are not concentrated in a single block or limited area. The 
dispersed nature of the Garífuna community in New York, and the fact that 
migrants work long hours, constituted a challenge to carrying out the research 
and limited the number of informants available. Research in NYC was originally 
planned to last two weeks, but it was later extended by two weeks after the trip 
to Honduras. Members of the Santa Rosa de Aguan HTA were contacted on the 
second trip to NYC, and thus the corresponding hometown and CBOs in 
Honduras were not interviewed.    
 
3. Since the major projects for the provision of public goods financed by the 
interviewed HTAs were executed more than 10 years ago, in many cases it was 
not possible to find informants in the HTAs or in the hometowns who had 
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worked on these projects. Those that had, could not recall many details. The 
findings on these experiences, and therefore the discussion of the ex-post 
factors, were not as complete as they were desired to be. 
 
4. Information on the current Patronatos is also not as detailed as was planned, due 
to the fact that in Limón and Santa Fé, even though members of the Patronatos 
were contacted, the Patronatos are currently not active, or seldom meet. In 
Sangrelaya no member of the Patronato was contacted, but a (recent) former 
member provided the information. All the Patronatos of the visited towns are 
constituted legally. It was, however, not possible to obtain a copy of the statutes 
or any documentation from them. Evaluating the effectiveness of projects on 
other criteria besides their completion was not possible. 
 
5. Since the research focused on the CR sent by HTAs composed of migrants 
belonging to the Garífuna ethnic group, the conclusions derived from it should 
not necessarily be generalised to all Honduran HTAs in the USA.  
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4. Determinants for Hometown Associations Provision 
of Public Goods in Honduran Garífuna Towns - 
Research Results 
 
4.1 An Institutional Perspective explaining CR in the Garífuna 
case  
4.1.1 Hometown Associations 
•  HTA Motives 
 
The members of each of the HTAS interviewed shared a common cultural and ethnic 
background - each interviewed HTA was composed of members who came from the 
same hometown, and all of them belong to the Garífuna ethnic group. It is common to 
find that the boards of these organisations include cousins or brothers, as was the case 
with the Sangrelaya HTA. This characteristic of HTAs can be explained by the 
migration pattern followed by the Garífuna. Puerta’s observation that migration to the 
USA follows a group behaviour pattern was confirmed in conversations with HTA 
members. Migrants from a particular community of origin tend to attract other family 
members and friends. They may decide to travel in groups and follow a common route 
to the USA. Once in the USA, they may even look for jobs together, often finding 
employment with the same employer104. 
 
Migrants do not lose contact with their hometowns and country of origin. They assume 
responsibility for the family members left behind. It is seen as the “right thing to do” not 
only to help relatives, but also the community as a whole. In the hometowns, it is 
expected that those that migrate will not only send remittances to their immediate 
relatives, but will also bring gifts to their extended family and friends when visiting the 
town during vacations. HTA members identify themselves as “hijos del pueblo” (sons 
of the town) and consider that they continue to belong to their hometowns, even though 
their place of residence is now the USA. The internalisation of this ethical rule is clearly 
shown in the words of a lady interviewee: “It is my duty as hija del pueblo to help my 
town and share my luck with my relatives and friends back home.” 
 
                                                 
104 Puerta (2002), pp. 19. 
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Board members of the interviewed organisations answered that Garífuna migrants 
organised themselves to improve the living conditions in their hometowns, given the 
fact that traditionally these communities have received little aid from the central 
authorities and that the local authorities lacked the resources to satisfy the communities’ 
overwhelming needs. One informant expressed the migrants shared idea: that “it is 
easier to answer our town’s necessities when working as a group”. 
 
It was observed that the interviewed HTAs were all founded to carry out a specific 
project in the community, either as an answer to a request for aid from the community 
or as a self-help initiative from migrants to satisfy a particular need in their hometown. 
In the 1970s a committee of citizens from the town of Santa Rosa de Aguan was 
organised to pave the town’s main access road. The migrants from Santa Rosa living in 
New York responded to the community’s request for financial help by establishing the 
Organisation for the Development of Aguan. In the case of Limón the HTA was also 
born as a result of the organised inhabitants’ request for help to the hijos del pueblo in 
New York.  The Organisation of Ladies from Limón in New York started in 1989 as a 
group of migrant women from Limón that carried out activities to raise funds to be used 
in the potable water project in their hometown. Two HTAs were organised in order to 
construct a community centre in their respective hometowns: in the beginning of the 
1980s, the Ladies from Santa Fé in New York, and a couple of years later, the 
Sangrelayas Unidos in New York (SUNY). In the opinion of one informant: “Without 
the financial aid of HTAs in NYC to the Patronatos our town would have never had 
electricity or water.” He concluded that “without our help the town would simply not 
develop.” 
 
Membership in the HTAs also provides private benefits for the migrants, however. One 
of the HTA goals (as expressed in the Ladies from Limón Statutes), is to preserve 
Garífuna traditions. All the interviewed HTAs had one or more traditional dance 
groups, which perform at parties and other activities. Such groups and activities are a 
way to “preserve our roots and teach our children our traditions”, as an interviewed 
member of an HTA said. An additional goal of all of the HTAs interviewed is the 
possibility of helping to repatriate the bodies of members or their relatives to be buried 
in their hometowns, and of providing  financial aid to the deceased’s relatives in NYC 
or in Honduras. 
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• Organisational Structure - Election Procedures 
 
Even though attendance of HTA activities, such as the yearly parties, can sometimes be 
in excess of 200 migrants, and in the interviewed HTAs all migrants coming from the 
same hometown have the right to participate in their general assemblies, active 
members usually total no more than 20 persons. The Boards are usually composed of 
eight to ten persons elected in a general assembly. They include the positions of 
President or Coordinator, Vice-president, Secretary, Fiscal, Treasurer, Vocals, in many 
cases assigned to particular issues like women or children, and one or more advisors.  
The exact period of duration of the directives in the interviewed organisations was not 
clearly delimited, but general assemblies are held on a yearly basis and, depending on 
the need, may be called more than once a year. Some HTAs group themselves in 
Federations, such as the Garífuna Coalition. This federation was organised in 1998 for 
the celebration of the 200-year presence of the Garífuna in Honduras, and currently 
includes 13 organisations, 7 of which are non-profit HTAs and the rest Garífuna-owned 
business corporations. The HTAs from 5 different villages of the municipality of Iriona 
(including the interviewed SUNY) constitute the Organisation of Groups from Iriona 
(OGI). Recently, Garífuna HTAs have started claim legal status in the USA, 
incorporating themselves as Domestic Not-for-profit Corporations in the State of New 
York. Some have obtained or are currently applying for recognition from the Internal 
Revenue Service as Tax Exempt Organisations. This status allows the HTAs to receive 
donations from the public and foundations, while the donors obtain tax relief for the 
amount donated.  
• Decision-making  
 
Board meetings are held once a month, as in the case of SUNY, or more sporadically 
according to necessity, as in the case of the Ladies from Limón. Routinely, decisions for 
coordinating fund-raising activities scheduled since the beginning of the year are taken 
by majority vote during the board’s meetings.  The decision to undertake a large project 
in the community, however, is usually discussed after inviting more members of the 
migrant community to a general assembly. 
 
Clarifying the decision-making procedures and the responsibilities of each of the board 
members of the HTAs seems to be a critical factor in reducing the level of difficulty 
required to carry out the activities necessary to raise and send funds to the hometowns. 
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A former member of an HTA stated that he perceived that “too much time was spent in 
the meetings… we gathered every month for almost three years and I saw no concrete 
action taken for the benefit of the town”. He added that “even though different positions 
existed within the board, all financial decisions were taken by the coordinator”. 
 
Informants observed that many former members left the HTA after conflicts rose 
concerning the responsibility of each member within the board. Such conflicts have led 
many HTAs to remain inactive for long periods of time, or even to cease to exist. With 
the exception of the Aguan organisation, all interviewed HTAs had previous 
predecessor organisations, with different names, also constituted to help the hometowns.  
The Ladies from Limón were originally a supporting group within the Frente Social 
Limóneño, an organisation that has long ceased to exist. No active board member of the 
Santa Fé HTA was to be found in New York during the field research, but the President 
of the Garífuna Coalition (see Appendix A5.1) commented that the group had resigned 
from its membership of the federations, and a member of the HTA interviewed in Santa 
Fé described the situation of the group as “a weak one”. After working in its hometown 
at the end of the 1980s, SUNY didn’t operate for about 10 years. A new group of 
Sangrelaya migrants started to meet again about 3 years ago. It is only within the last 5 
years that HTAs have sought to be legally constituted and to explore the possibility of 
receiving tax exemption status. According to SUNY´s coordinator of the last few years 
“we have concentrated on an organisational strengthening… working to incorporate our 
organisation legally, and to be recognised with tax exemption status”. Such legal 
procedures force the organisations to record their objectives and consider formal rules 
for regulating their procedures. The Aguan Organisation and Ladies from Limón have 
also recently been incorporated legally (see Appendices A3.1 and A3.2). 
• Fund-raising 
 
HTAs raise funds by carrying out activities planned since the beginning of the year, for 
example tours to amusement parks, raffles and selling tickets to annual parties (see 
Appendices A3.3 and A3.4) where their dancing groups perform. Deciding on which 
activity to carry out is not particularly difficult since the HTAs usually do the same 
events on the same dates every year. The only HTA interviewed that charges a 
membership fee is SUNY. According to a former president and another former member, 
many migrants from Sangrelaya perceive this fee (currently U$50 per month) as a 
burden on their limited budgets. The reluctance to pay the fee has resulted in many 
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migrants leaving the HTA. The current coordinator, however, argues that in the future 
the HTA will arrange activities both in the town and in NYC that will produce profit for 
the members. Such for-profit activities, however, are not available to non-profit and tax 
exempt organisations under American law. 
 
 The interviewed HTAs estimated they can raise between US$2 000 and US$3 000 with 
their annual activities. Any project within the community that requires more funding 
than this involves the execution of extraordinary activities and takes more than a year to 
raise the funds; it is therefore viewed as more difficult to assist. Tax exemption status 
offers the possibility of as yet unexplored sources of project finance, besides the 
traditional raffles and parties. 
4.1.2 Hometown CBOs  
• Hometown CBO Motives 
 
HTAs usually don’t carry out work in the hometowns directly, but send the funds raised 
to the organised inhabitants in the community. The interviewed HTAs have no 
experience of working with the local municipalities, but instead have cooperated with 
the Patronatos or with committees of citizens organised for a particular project. They 
have also worked with the Catholic Church’s groups of laymen known as Pastorales.  
 
Patronatos are local volunteer development organisations that are organised in 
Honduran towns and villages to address public issues and work for the execution of 
social projects in the communities. The smallest units of government in Honduras are 
the municipalities; each municipality may include many villages. In isolated villages or 
neighbourhoods, where the presence of the municipal authorities is not felt, Patronatos 
assume the functions of the local authorities. Within the Patronatos, committees for 
particular projects can be constituted, such as a committee for electricity, for potable 
water, for road construction, etc. The goal of a Patronato, as expressed by the 
informants, is “to improve the living conditions in our towns” by “organising the 
community for cooperating in those works that develop the town and by demanding the 
attention of the authorities in supplying necessities for our people”. 
 
Pastorales are constituted for religious works and for maintaining and improving the 
church’s temples. Their goal is that of “taking care of the brothers and sisters in the 
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community… looking after the needs of the temple and organising activities to counsel 
and orient”. 
 
Prestige, and the possibility of running for a political position, seems to provide some of 
the reasons for joining a Patronato. It is common that mayors in the hometowns have 
some experience working in the Patronatos or public works committees. The current 
mayor of Limón was the treasurer of the committee for electricity, which managed CR 
from the Ladies from Limón. The current president of Santa Fé´s Patronato ran for the 
mayoral candidacy position during one party’s primary election campaign.  
 
Since the hijos del pueblo are still seen as part of the community, when the state and 
international cooperation-aided projects require the town’s partnership, inhabitants find 
that “the hijos del pueblo in NYC earn dollars and can raise more money”. Pastorales 
also consider that the migrants are in a better economic condition to contribute 
financially to its projects. 
• Organisational Structure-Election Procedures 
 
Inhabitants of the interviewed hometowns recognise the Patronatos as “the organisation 
responsible for representing our interests”. Municipal and central authorities in 
Honduras see in them a link to the community. When a project requires the help of the 
towns` inhabitants, Patronatos are usually contacted by the authorities. Patronatos are 
elected in general assemblies to which all the town’s inhabitants are invited. Their board 
is made up of a Coordinator or President, a Vice-president, a Treasurer, a Fiscal, a 
Secretary and one or more Vocals. In the cases of the projects where the interviewed 
HTAs participated, committees for each specific project were constituted within the 
Patronatos. Each committee had a board of its own and is responsible for carrying out 
the activities of the project. 
 
Even though all the Patronatos in the visited towns are constituted legally and some of 
them have written statutes, all of the interviewed board members admitted they didn’t 
know or had not read the statutes. The period of duration of the Patronatos is also not 
clear. Some members indicated it was two years and others four. In Santa Fé, the deputy 
mayor commented that the current Patronato “is not operating and it is not recognised 
by the majority of the inhabitants”, despite the fact that its members were elected four 
years previously. He thought a new assembly should be arranged to elect a new 
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Patronato. The mayor of Limón commented that during his four years in office, three 
different Patronatos had resigned after showing poor results. The previous president left 
for the USA without informing the rest of the board members. When referring to the 
committees that worked with the HTAs in the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s he 
stated that “the problem with committees is that they stop after achieving their goal.”   
 
In the construction of the Temple in Limón, the Pastoral organised a daughter group of   
“Ladies from Limón in Limón” to assist the church in the projects financed by the HTA.  
• Decision-making 
 
Routine decisions of the Patronato are taken during board meetings, but most important 
issues that require the cooperation of the whole community are raised in general town 
assemblies. The committees for the projects that execute the HTA-financed projects are 
also constituted in a general assembly. Since carrying out general assemblies is 
perceived as “difficult” or “highly difficult”, unless members of the community are 
interested in constituting a new Patronato or an urgent issue arises, it is most likely that 
many years will pass before an assembly is held. The board might consider it a difficult 
task to call for an assembly, but it seems the very lack of such assemblies, such as in the 
case of Santa Fé, leads to a lack of recognition from the community. In Limón, each of 
the assemblies carried out during the last three years resulted in the resignation of the 
few remaining board members and the election of new ones. 
4.1.3 The Collective Remittances Contract 
 
In migrant-producing Garífuna towns, members of the Patronato have relatives in the 
USA who visit them regularly, or members of the Patronato themselves then move to 
the USA to work. Such is the case of the former President of the Limón Patronato. Both 
the current President of the Sangrelaya Unidos in New York and the Coordinator of the 
Ladies from Limón were part of their hometown’s Patronatos when living in Honduras.  
 
It is a common practice among Honduran municipalities, central government, and 
national and international development organisations to ask for partnership with the 
community in social work projects. This partnership is coordinated by the Patronato. 
When a new project is started and the community’s partnership is required, the 
community turns to their relatives in the USA for financial help. Usually they request 
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help from an organised group of migrants in the USA, or an HTA member becomes 
aware of the project during one of his visits to Honduras and then suggests that the HTA 
should cooperate with it. 
 
The contracts established between the HTAs and the Patronatos or Pastorales are of an 
implicit nature. Since all the projects are usually executed by the local CBOs, the HTAs 
limit themselves to providing funds, and are usually not strongly involved in 
programming the activities to be carried out in the hometowns. In the studied cases of 
CR, programming the activities needed for project execution was not a particularly 
difficult task for the HTAs. They devoted their time and effort to carrying the fund 
raising activities. Local CBOs, on the contrary, were not as much concerned with fund-
raising as they were with coordinating the local work, particularly in planning the 
volunteer labour force. No documents are created in this process, and therefore social 
sanctions serve as an enforcement mechanism.  
 
HTA members with relatives in the partner CBOs expect their relatives to work 
honestly. In the words of an informant, “Who but our relatives should be most trusted?” 
He added that “we expect them to honour our trust and appreciate the hard work of the 
hijos del pueblo”. The same is true from the hometowns’ side. A member of a Pastorale 
expressed that he and his family felt “proud when visiting the church’s temple, which 
was constructed thanks to my sister’s work as coordinator of a committee of ladies in 
NYC, and mostly to her personal monetary contribution”. A plate with the names of the 
members of the HTA is displayed in the entrance of the Catholic temple. 
 
If an inhabitant member of a partner CBO doesn’t manage resources adequately, it 
would provoke social sanctions against his relative who is a member of the HTA. It is 
possible that the relative in NYC would be considered to have betrayed the migrants’ 
trust in his family, and would therefore be viewed as responsible as well. 
 
A Patronato or committee that doesn’t manage resources adequately would lose the 
confidence of the HTA in NYC. A Patronato with a bad reputation cannot expect the 
HTA to supply additional requests for aid for new projects. 
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Table 5 (An Institutional Explanation of CR in the Garífuna Case) summarises the 
findings on the contractual actors of collective remittances, and the characteristics of the 
contracts established between them. 
Table 5: An Institutional Explanation of CR in the Garífuna Case 
Indicator Description Finding 
IA. HTAs   
IA1. HTA Motives 
 
* Reasons why a migrant 
should contribute to their 
hometown’s wellbeing by 
financing the provision of 
public goods 
 
* Reasons why a migrant 
should join an HTA 
 
 
* Reasons why an HTA is 
created 
 
* HTA’s list of goals 
 
 
 
 
* Reasons why an HTA 
should send CR to a CBO for 
providing public goods 
* Ethical rule: “My duty as hijo del pueblo is 
to help my town and share my luck with my 
relatives and friends back home.” 
* Share point of view: “It is easier to answer 
our town’s needs when working as a group.” 
 
* Members of HTAs have private benefits:  
financial aid in case of need, and transmitting 
the Garífuna traditions to future generations. 
 
* All HTAs were founded to carry out a 
specific project in the community. 
 
* Contribute to the hometown´s development 
* Help in repatriating dead migrants and 
comforting their relatives. 
* Preserve the Garífuna traditions in the USA 
. 
* Shared point of view: “Lack of state interest 
or budget for the needs of the <minority 
group> Garífuna towns.” 
 * “Without the financial aid of HTAs the 
town would simply not develop.” 
IA2. Decision-
making procedures 
 
* Description of organisational 
structure 
 
* Description of board 
member election procedure  
 
* Description of decision-
making 
 
 * 10-20 Active members. General assembly, 
open to all migrants from the hometown, 
elects 8 to 10-member board. 
* 5 years ago started process to be constituted 
legally in USA: write goals and basic rules 
 
* Routine decisions: board meeting, monthly 
or as the necessities rise.  
* Decision to undertake large project: 
Assembly.  
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IA3. Workload in 
decision-making 
* Perceived level of 
difficulty 
* Difficult when institutions are not clearly set 
and known 
* Lack of clear written rules of board’s 
responsibility led to conflicts in the past.  
Members left and previous HTAs ceased to 
exist. 
IA4. Fund-raising 
mechanisms for 
CR 
* Description of way funds 
are raised 
*Raffles, yearly parties. Same activities every 
year, and special ones for larger projects. Fees in 
one of the interviewed HTAs 
* Normal activities - US$3 000 per year 
IA5. Workload in 
fund-raising for CR 
* Perceived level of 
difficulty 
* Deciding on normal activities easy: same 
events on same dates every year 
* Difficult to finance projects that require more 
than US$3 000: Requires several years and 
extraordinary fund-raising activities. 
* Membership fees perceived as a burden. Not 
sustainable 
IB. CBOs   
IB1.  CBO Motives * Reasons why an inhabitant 
should joint a Patronato or 
other CBO 
 
* Reasons why a CBO is 
created 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* CBO´s list of goals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Patronato membership provides prestige and 
permits pursuance of a political career  
 
 
* Patronatos: Address the inhabitants’ needs, 
especially in isolated villages or where state 
presence is scarce (Garífuna towns). 
 
* Committees for special projects (electricity 
and water) constituted within Patronatos. 
 
* Pastorales: Created for religious works and 
maintaining/improving temples. 
 
* Patronatos:  
- Improve the living conditions in towns 
- Organise community cooperation in public 
works. 
- Demanding the attention of the authorities. 
* Pastorales: 
- Care of Catholic community 
- Maintain temple  
- Organise religious counselling activities 
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* Reasons why a 
hometown’s CBO should 
cooperate with an HTA in a 
project for the provision of 
public goods 
 
* Local inhabitants lack resources for the 
required partnership in state-financed projects. 
Migrants are in a better economic position to 
contribute 
IB2. Workload in 
decision-making 
* Perceived level of 
difficulty 
* Difficult due to lack of clear institutions 
* Current Patronatos: inactive or not recognised 
by inhabitants 
* Uncertainty on the “legal” length of the 
Patronato´s term leads to conflicts in town  
* Difficult to arrange town assembly. Requires 
too much effort 
* Lack of assemblies can cause a loss of 
recognition of the Patronato  
The Contract of Collective Remittances between the HTAS and the local CBOs 
IC The contract of 
CR  
 
* Description of the contract 
established 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Sanctions for members of 
an HTA  
 
* Sanctions for members of 
an CBO  
* Implicit Contract. No documents. Social 
sanctions- kinship: enforcement mechanism  
* Role of HTAs: To provide financial resources. 
Little intervention of HTAs in the activities 
executed. 
*    Role of the local CBOs:  To plan and 
execute all the works in the hometowns 
 
* Disgrace/pride for family of contributing  
migrant 
 
* Shame for the relatives in NYC. Reputation is 
lost.  No trust for further projects 
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4.2 Factors in the Interaction between the HTAs and Local 
CBOs previous to the Transacting of CR – Adverse Selection 
Problems 
• Screening Mechanisms 
 
The Ladies from Limón’s Statutes declare that the organisation “… will support and 
work jointly with any organic body constituted in a general assembly for the 
development of Limón’s town”. 
 
All of the interviewed HTAs considered that they should support those groups in the 
hometowns that are more representative of the town, that is those legitimately accepted 
by the hometown inhabitants as representing the town’s needs. Patronatos and their 
committees are therefore seen as ideal partners. Since priests are perceived as 
trustworthy within each of the communities, the Pastorales under their supervision are 
also considered reliable partners. However HTAs work with these groups only in those 
projects with religious aims, such as the improvement of temples. A unique case 
occurred in the building of the communal centre in Santa Fé, where a daughter group 
was constituted as “The Ladies from Santa Fé in Santa Fé”.  The group’s function was 
to assist the HTA in supervising the works during the project’s execution, and to 
manage the centre once it was completed. 
 
If the HTA considers it highly difficult to find a reliable partner it will not agree to 
supply CR. Such is the case in Limón, where one informant stated: “We want to 
contribute to our town’s well-being, but at the moment we are not able to find a 
Patronato capable enough to run projects”. The Coordinator of the Limón HTA sent a 
letter urging the President of the Patronato to strengthen their organisation, and has 
offered their help in doing so. Unless they perceive the Patronato to be capable, the 
organisation’s board has decided it will not support projects in the town. Similarly, 
since the Patronato of Santa Fé is not recognised by a large proportion of the 
inhabitants, board members of the HTA consider it highly difficult to find reliable 
partners and are not willing to support new projects in the town. 
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• Signalling Mechanisms 
 
According to the informants (with the exception of Santa Fé), in all the HTA-financed 
projects, the initiative came from the Patronatos and its committees for particular 
projects. Committees for the projects in the hometowns were constituted before the 
HTAs were contacted. Members of these committees spoke with their relatives in the 
HTA, or when those members of the HTA visited the town they were invited to 
committee meetings to hear about their projects. Members of committees that travelled 
to the USA to visit their relatives would motivate the HTA to cooperate with the 
project. Since the contact between migrants and local inhabitants is continuous, 
informants in Honduras consider it easy to contact HTAs and present them with new 
projects.  
 
It is the opinion of HTA informants that when a Patronato presents a definite idea for a 
project, which is strongly supported by the community, to the HTA, the HTA will 
probably support it financially. 
• Selecting the Project  
 
Negotiating which project should be financed is currently perceived as a “highly 
difficult” task by both the HTAs. Selection of projects is a potential source of conflict 
between the local and migrant community. This is more likely to happen when the local 
inhabitants lack a strong organisation, or committees with clearly-defined projects to be 
carried out, and the initiative comes unilaterally from NYC. In Limón, the HTA has 
defined as its next priority project the construction of a funeral home. The list of future 
projects was compiled by the board members and then discussed with the general 
assembly. Majority vote was defined as the criterion to discriminate one project from 
another. The hometown inhabitants, however, seem not to share the points of view of 
the HTA concerning the town’s needs. All of the interviewed local inhabitants 
expressed their disagreement with this project. Some of them said it was too expensive 
to train personnel and manage a funeral home, others that holding funerals in their 
houses has always been part of the Garífuna culture and that the migrants were trying to 
“impose” American customs on the Honduran towns. An informant in Limón 
concluded:  “If they in New York would bother to ask the town’s opinion on the funeral 
home, they would realize we have more urgent needs here”. 
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In all the previous experiences in which the HTAs participated, the hometowns usually 
proposed one project at a time. Each proposed project was seen overwhelmingly by the 
local town as the community’s immediate need, and one to which all the inhabitants 
were strongly committed.  In a letter to the Patronato the Ladies from Limón in NYC 
urged them to develop a list of the town’s most urgent needs.  
 
Figure 6 (Findings on Adverse Selection) presents the findings on the search and 
information costs incurred in the interaction between HTAs and local CBOs which 
determine whether or not CR are transacted for the provision of public goods. 
Table 6: Findings on Adverse Selection  
Hypothesis Indicator Description Finding 
1. High search & 
information costs 
for selecting a 
capable and 
trustworthy local 
CBO to manage 
CR and execute 
projects prevent 
HTAs from 
supplying CR for 
the provision of 
public goods in 
their hometowns 
 
AS1A. Screening 
mechanisms for 
selecting adequate 
hometown CBOs 
* Existence of selection 
criteria 
* Description of selection 
criteria 
* Description of selection 
process 
* Selection Criteria: Groups 
elected with inhabitants 
participation and accepted 
by inhabitants as 
representing the town’s 
needs = Patronatos -
Committees 
- More trustable groups = 
Priest - Pastorales 
* When Patronatos / 
Pastorales present a 
concrete project  that is 
strongly supported by the 
whole town, HTA decides 
in an assembly to finance it. 
AS1B. Signalling 
mechanisms from 
the hometown 
CBOs 
* Existence of signalling 
mechanisms 
* Description of signalling 
mechanisms 
* In all the HTA-financed 
projects, initiative came 
from the Patronatos 
* Local Committee starts 
working on the project on 
its own, relatives in USA 
are telephoned, visiting 
HTA members are invited to 
local meetings or committee 
members present idea when 
visiting the USA. 
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AS1C. Search and 
Information Costs 
* Perceived level of 
difficulty 
*When HTA consider it 
highly difficult to find a 
reliable partner it would not 
agree not supply CR. 
* Currently all interviewed 
HTAs perceive it highly 
difficult. HTA from Limón 
sent a letter to the Patronato 
urging it (and offering help) 
to strengthen its capacity in 
order to finance new 
projects.  
2.High search-
information costs 
for selecting the 
project to be 
financed by 
HTAs prevent 
HTAs from 
supplying CR for 
the provision of 
public goods in 
their hometowns 
 
AS2A Project 
Selection Process 
* Existence of projects list 
developed by hometown 
CBOs 
* Existence of defined and 
known selection criteria 
* Description of selection 
criteria 
* Existence of defined and 
known selection procedure  
* Description of selection 
process 
* No projects list currently 
elaborated in the 
hometowns due to inactive 
Patronatos 
* Current lists of future 
projects in Limón and 
Sangrelaya: developed by 
the HTA. Majority vote is 
the criterion used to 
discriminate one project 
from another.  
* Previous experiences: 
town presented 1 project at 
a time. Each had the town’s 
strong commitment. 
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AS2B. Search and 
Information Costs 
* Perceived level of 
difficulty 
* Currently seen as highly 
difficult by both sides. In 
Limón the HTA sent a letter 
urging the Patronato to write 
list of the town’s needs. 
Patronato and local 
inhabitants disagree with 
current HTA list. Migrants 
perceived by locals as 
imposing their ideas, 
disregarding locals’ 
opinions, and therefore 
ignoring town’s real needs. 
* Currently highly difficult 
in the case of Sangrelaya. 
HTA proposes a different 
contract to the traditional 
unwritten one. HTA will not 
provide cash, and wants to 
buy materials directly. 
Patronato perceives it to be  
difficult and time-
consuming. It refuses to 
work with the HTA in this 
way. 
 
4.3 Factors in the Interaction between HTAs and Hometown 
CBOs during the Transacting of CR - Moral Hazard Problems 
4.3.1 HTA Participation in the Provision of Public Goods in the Garífuna 
Hometowns 
• Limón 
 
At the beginning of the 1980s a committee for the construction of a potable water 
system was constituted in Limón. The committee travelled several times to the capital 
city, until around 1989 it obtained the support of the National Water and Sewage 
Service (SANAA) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). SANAA 
performed the necessary technical studies, created a budget and agreed to finance 20% 
of the project. IADB would finance 40%, and 20% was left to the local inhabitants, 
being the contribution of the labour force used for digging the holes for the pipelines. 
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Members of the committee with relatives in the then Frente Limóneño HTA sent a letter 
asking for financial help. A group of women from Limón living in the USA offered help 
to the Frente and the “Ladies Committee for Limón´s Potable Water” was constituted. 
The ladies organised food sales and parties during three years, raising approximately  
L80,000 (US$16,000). Local inhabitants provided the labour force. The community’s 
contribution, including the value of the labour force, was estimated to be L130,000 
(US$26,000). The water system was inaugurated in 1992.  A water administration board 
was constituted by local inhabitants, and managed the system until it was replaced 
around 1999. Technical mistakes attributed to SANAA´s engineers, and damage caused 
by Hurricane Mitch, led to the system’s collapse, and a new one was built with USAID 
funds. 
 
A committee for the town’s electrification, which, unlike the potable water committee, 
was constituted legally independent from the Patronato, was elected in a general 
assembly at the end of the 1980s. After requesting support from the central authorities 
for several years, the National Enterprise of Electricity (ENEE) was able to budget 
funds for the project. The town, however, was required to finance the electrical posts 
and the work necessary for their installation. The treasurer of the committee presented 
the idea to the Ladies of Limón when visiting relatives in USA. The Ladies agreed to 
help, and a Committee for the Electrification of Limón in New York was constituted in 
1994. In two years the committee raised funds toalling about L70,000 (US$11,000). 
Funds were used to buy lamps, but also to finance the trips of local inhabitants to the 
capital city for meetings with ENEE. The local inhabitants’ contribution consisted of the 
labour force used for clearing paths and installing the posts. The electricity project was 
finished around 1996. 
 
The ladies in NYC sent an additional L25,000 (US$4,000) to the electricity committee, 
which in the end was not used on the project. Since some of the ladies knew about the 
Pastorale’s project to reconstruct the temple, they decided that the funds should be 
employed in the church’s reconstruction. HTA´s financial contributions were used for 
buying materials, and the labour force was provided by the community. A group of 
women in the Pastorale decided to form the “Ladies from Limón in Limón” (see 
Appendix A5.2) as a counterpart to the HTA contribution. Their work consisted of 
providing food to the volunteer workers in the temple. The group still exists today. 
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Whenever needs in the church arise, usually for equipment or for financing religious 
youth camps, aid is requested from the Ladies in New York. 
 
On their own initiative, the Ladies from Limón in NYC have bought books for the local 
schools during the last two years. When visiting Honduras HTAs, members give the 
books to the school principals (see Appendix A4.1). 
• Santa Fé 
 
In New York a group of migrant women from Santa Fé noticed, during their visits to 
their hometown, that Santa Fé, unlike most Garífuna towns, lacked a community centre 
where traditional and religious festivities could be held. They came together to raise 
funds for its construction. The HTA decided that an engineer cousin of one of the 
boardmembers would be responsible for managing the project. To assist the engineer 
and to manage the centre once constructed, a filial group of “Ladies from Santa Fé in 
Santa Fé” (see Appendix A5.3) was constituted. Responsibility for the project’s 
execution, however, remained with the engineer. Conflicts arose between the engineer 
and the local committee and, after about three years of fund-raising, the HTA stopped 
sending funds. The community centre was only partially completed - doors, windows 
and the like were missing. The local Ladies assumed its management and carried out 
additional activities for purchasing the doors and windows. The centre is currently in 
use, although not completely finished.    
 
The Ladies, upon request from the Pastorale, continually donate or finance equipment 
for the temple and contribute financially to religious youth camps (see Appendix A4.2). 
• Sangrelaya 
 
The local Patronato in Sangrelaya asked the “hijos del pueblo” in NYC for financial aid 
to construct a community centre in the 1980s. The Sangrelaya Unidos in New York was 
organised, and sent funds to the Patronato. The centre was completed in the mid-1980s. 
 
In 2002 a member of the HTA received a donation of 20 used computers, which were 
sent to the local school. Though repairs were attempted in the town, only eight worked 
(see Appendix A4.3). 
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• Santa Rosa de Aguan 
 
The Organisation for the Development of Aguan is, according to its Fiscal, one of the 
oldest and perhaps one of the most stable Garífuna organisations in the USA. It has 
worked continuously since the 1970s on various social projects in the town of Santa 
Rosa de Aguan. During that time it cooperated with the local committee on the paving 
of the main access road. In the 1980s it also partially financed the construction of the 
community centre. In 1986 it contributed to an electricity project, and in 1997 it 
financed the construction of a kiosk in the town’s recently renovated central park. The 
town was severely damaged by Hurricane Mitch, and access has become difficult. The 
town’s Central Business District is currently moving to a new location, and the HTA is 
contributing financially to the local committee for the construction of a paved road to 
the new CBD.  It is estimated that the HTA has sent a total of between US$6,000 and 
US$7,000 during the last three years. The funds were used for preliminary work in the 
construction of the road. However, the project has been stopped, due to the lack of 
budget from the authorities for installing a hanging bridge, and because of disagreement 
with moving the CBD and access road coming from a group of inhabitants living close 
to the old CBD. 
 
Table 7 (HTA participation in providing public goods) presents the main characteristics 
of the projects executed or those still being executed by the sample HTAs. 
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Table 7: HTA participation in providing public goods 
Hometown Project Recipient 
Hometown 
CBO 
Funds  
raised, 
sent and 
used 
(L1000) 
Year 
funds 
were 
first 
sent 
Project 
Duration 
 
Final 
Result 
Limón Financial 
contribution to 
Potable Water 
System 
Committee for 
Water 
80*a 1989 3 years Completed 
Financial 
contribution 
To the 
Electrification 
of the streets 
Committee for 
Electrification 
70*b 1994 2 years Completed 
Financial 
contribution to 
the Catholic 
Temple 
Reconstruction 
Pastorale-
Ladies from 
Limón in 
Limón 
> 25*c 1994 1 year Completed 
School Books 
Donations 
Local 
Schools 
n/i 2003 
2004 
Yearly 
activity 
Completed 
Santa Fé Communal 
Centre 
construction 
Ladies from 
Santa Fé in 
Santa  Fé 
n/i 1980s 3 years 70% 
Completed 
Catholic 
Temple 
equipment 
Pastorale n/i 2003 
2004 
Done 
regularly 
Completed 
Financial 
contribution to 
access road 
construction 
Patronato n/i  N/i Completed 
Sangrelaya Community 
Centre 
construction 
Patronato n/i 1980s n/i Completed 
Computers 
donated to   
school 
Local school Donated 
to the 
HTA 
2002 - 40% 
Completed 
8 of 20 
computers 
worked 
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Santa Rosa 
de Aguan 
Financial 
contribution  to 
access  road 
construction 
n/i Committe
e  for road 
constructi
on 
1970s n/i Completed 
Financial 
contribution to 
the 
electrification 
of the streets 
n/i Patronato 1986 n/i Completed 
Kiosk in Park  
construction 
n/i Patronato 1997 n/i Completed 
Financial 
contribution  to 
the new access 
road 
construction 
Committee for 
Road 
Construction 
120*d 2002 n/i Not 
completed: 
currently 
stopped  
Source: Interview with informants in the HTAs and in the hometowns. 
n/i : No Information available 
* a: approximately US$ 16,000         * b: approximately US$ 11,000  
 
* c: more than US$ 4,000                 * d: approximately US$ 6,000- US$ 7,000 
 
4.3.2 Working Mechanisms for Supplying CR 
  
In all of the studied projects the provision of funds by HTAs was done as the necessity 
arose. No calendar for sending CR was written, and no compromise on the periodicity 
and quantity of the disbursements was established. Patronatos or committees telephoned 
the HTAs when more funds were needed. Usually it was not necessary to wait for the 
funds to be raised, because the HTAs continued with their regular activities and, when 
involved in larger projects, would work in additional ones. Receiving the funds was 
only a matter of the time needed to make them available to the local CBOs. The funds 
were usually sent in cash with members who travelled to the hometowns in order to visit 
relatives. In the case of the electrification project in Limón, a bank account was opened 
with the signature of the coordinator of the local committee and that of the Ladies from 
Limón in NYC. Signed withdrawal forms were sent by courier or mail to the local 
committee with the requested amount. In the case of Santa Fé, the activities were 
programmed and carried out by the contracted engineer. He would request funds from 
the HTA, and receive them when members visited the hometown, or via bank transfers. 
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Since receiving the funds for most of the projects usually required waiting for HTA 
members to visit Honduras, the process could sometimes be perceived as time-
consuming from the local CBO side. The HTAs would argue that sending the money 
through a member saved bank commissions and, more importantly, giving the money 
“face to face” would oblige the CBOs to demonstrate to the visitor the concrete uses for 
previous disbursements and to explain the planned use was for the new ones.  In current 
projects, such as the Aguan access road project, similar practices still persist. Funds are 
requested by the HTAs via telephone or when visiting New York, with no plan of 
disbursement previously agreed upon.  
 
4.3.3 Monitoring Mechanisms of the Supplied CR - Monitoring Costs 
 
Since the nature of the contract established between the CBOs and the HTAs was of an 
implicit nature, no monitor mechanisms were previously agreed, much less written 
down. “We trusted the Patronato knew how best to use the money, since they were the 
ones doing the work” answered a former member of an HTA. Copies of the bought 
materials’ bills were usually sent to New York or given to HTAs members on visits to 
the town. For some uses, however,no bills were made available, for example the funds 
spent when the committees travelled to the capital city to meet with state enterprises 
performing the work, or those used by the Ladies from Limón in Limón to feed the 
volunteer workers. Monitoring mechanisms also relied more on personal (and therefore 
unplanned) visits of HTA members. After a project was concluded, or during its 
execution, accusations from inhabitants would usually arise concerning the use of the 
funds made by the local committees’ board members. Such accusations led to conflicts 
between the Ladies of Santa Fé in Santa Fé and the engineer and, as a result, the town’s 
commitment to and collaboration with the project decreased. Some local inhabitants 
argue that the building was not concluded because the engineer used the funds to move 
and live in the USA, and some migrants claimed it was the lack of cooperation of the 
inhabitants which forced the work to a halt. Monitoring was therefore perceived by the 
HTAs as a difficult task. In the case of Sangrelaya, the HTA refused to assist the local 
electrification committee with cash, but offered instead to send the required materials.  
The HTA Coordinator argued that, unlike previous migrant organisations, they are not 
willing to send money, as they considered that they lack the mechanisms to monitor its 
use. The committee argued, however, that such a process would be time-consuming 
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since materials would be bought only when members visited the town. As a result, no 
working relationship was established between the two. The village continues to this day 
without electricity. 
 
Table 8 (Findings on Moral Hazards) summarises the findings on the monitoring costs 
between HTAs and the local CBOs, which determine the effectiveness of the projects 
using CR for the provision of public goods. 
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Table 8: Findings on Moral Hazards  
Hypothesis Indicator Description Finding 
3. High 
monitoring 
costs prevent 
projects from 
being 
completed. 
 
MH1A. Process of 
supplying CR 
* Description of  the process 
of supplying CR to the  
hometown CBOs 
 
* CR sent as CBOs 
necessities arose 
* No agreed calendar of 
disbursements and amounts  
* Most cases cash sent with 
HTA members visiting the 
towns. 
MH1B. Monitoring 
Costs  
 
* Perceived level of 
difficulty 
*Some cases time-
consuming for CBOs to 
wait for HTA visit. 
* Fair for HTAs:  it served 
as a monitoring mechanism. 
4. High 
monitoring 
costs in the CR 
finance projects 
prevent them 
from being 
completed. 
 
MH2A.Monitoring 
Mechanisms 
 
*Description of reporting 
mechanism from the 
hometown CBOs to the 
HTA 
 
* No agreed mechanism. 
* Some of the bills were 
sent to USA or shown 
during visits. 
* Based more on visits of 
the HTA 
 
MH2B.  
Monitoring Costs 
 
* Perceived level of 
difficulty  
* Highly difficult 
* Accusations of improper 
use of HTA funds usually 
arose in the community. 
In Santa Fé accusations of 
the executing engineer 
demotivated town and led 
HTA to end its contribution. 
* In Sangrelaya, the lack of 
monitoring mechanisms is 
argued as reason for the 
decision not to provide cash 
any more. 
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5 Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Discussion of Findings- Conclusions 
5.1.1 Internal Institutions in the Contract of CR: The hijos del pueblo Duty  
 
Homogeneity, in the form of a shared hometown, ethnicity, and often kinship and 
religion, allows migrants to come together and establish an HTA. The Ethical Rule of 
the “hijos del pueblo” duty partly explains the motives behind migrants’ willingness to 
cooperate with the hometowns. HTAs` motivations, however, are not exclusively the 
provision of public goods in the hometowns; private benefits are tied to their existence, 
such as “insurance” in case of death and the transmission of traditions to the sons of 
migrants. Patronatos members are a group whose incentives are derived from the private 
benefit of prestige and of the possibility of pursuing a political career. 
 
Customs, in the form of reputation, pride or disgrace for the HTA and CBO members 
and for their “foreign” family (the one living in Honduras or in the USA, as the case 
may be), provide the enforcement mechanisms for the establishment of an agreement. 
 
On the one hand internal institutions are the explanation behind the HTA and local CBO 
incentives to work for the provision of public goods in the hometowns. But, 
paradoxically, when analysing the working mechanisms within the organisations and in 
their transacting process, the very informal nature of institutions seems to be insufficient 
to prevent the possibility of adverse selection and moral hazards from occurring. As a 
result, high search- information and monitoring costs occur, and contracts are not 
established or, when established, they are implanted ineffectively. 
5.1.2 Organisational Factors Lead to No Provision of Public Goods via 
Collective Remittances. 
 
Looking within the organisations, the lack of clear rules, especially in defining the 
board members responsibilities and the basic procedures to be followed, are responsible 
for conflicts arising between the members. Members perceive that the effort required to 
run the HTA in order to raise funds for the hometowns is just too high. They prefer to 
leave the organisation and let it die. On the hometown side the story is quite similar, 
only that here, the basic rule of the board’s term of duration is not clearly established or 
understood. Carrying out the general assemblies is perceived as particularly difficult.  
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The board would rather let time run, but as time passes the legitimacy of the Patronato 
is questioned more and more. Finally, people no longer recognise the existence of the 
Patronato. At the other extreme, every time a group of inhabitants dislikes the current 
Patronato to such a degree that they call for a new assembly, a new Patronato is 
established, regardless the old one’s age, and nothing prevents this from happening. 
Without an HTA to raise funds, or with one that spends time on arguing how things 
should be run, and with a Patronato that no-one in the town or outside it recognises, it 
cannot be expected that CR will be available to finance the provision of public goods.  
5.1.3 Adverse Selection Leads to No Provision of Public Goods via 
Collective Remittances. 
 
HTAs have in the past participated successfully in providing public goods to the 
Garifuna hometowns, but it seems that they are no longer working. Conditions in the 
migrant communities and in the hometowns have not changed that much, and that is 
probably the reason why CR participation in the provision of public goods doesn’t work 
today. The social customs are the same, relatives continue to travel from one country to 
the other as before. Agreements are still expected to be based on trust and reputation. 
The HTAs are still willing to finance the urgent needs of the community as they did 
before. The difference is that now it is not so clear what those needs are. The HTAs 
have developed their own lists of needs, and expect the inhabitants to agree with them 
without involving them. Representation and knowledge of the town’s needs are still the 
criteria used to select the partner groups. A visit from a member of a locally recognised 
group to the USA or of a migrant to one of the group’s meetings is sufficient for the 
town’s proposed project to obtain the HTA´s support. The Patronatos, however, are not 
recognised by the inhabitants any more, and they seldom hold meetings to which 
migrants can be invited. If the HTAs are now unable to find a reliable partner to signal 
them as to where funds should be employed for improving living conditions of family 
and relatives back home, and if the inhabitants feel their opinion is not taken into 
consideration by the HTAs any more, then it is no longer possible to establish a contract 
in which the HTAs agree to supply CR, and the local CBOs to employ CR, in providing 
public goods. The first hypothesis is proved true.  Adverse Selection problems prevent 
HTAs from establishing a contract to provide CR for financing projects providing 
public goods in the hometowns. 
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5.1.4 Moral Hazards lead to an Ineffective Provision of Public Goods via 
Collective Remittances. 
 
Since many projects have been completed in the past, it could be thought that their 
working mechanisms were the most appropriate ones. But many of the problems faced 
today have brought to light some of the weaknesses present in projects of the past. 
Disbursement calendars were not agreed because the Patronatos could rely on asking 
the HTA for funding every time the need arose. But the lack of such a plan increases 
uncertainty from both sides, since the CBOs can request funds when the HTAs are 
lacking them, and the HTAs might find alternative uses for the funds in NYC or for 
other necessities in the community. One project in a hometown was so successful that at 
the end the local CBO had more money than needed. The project ended and the CBO 
didn’t know what to do with the additional funds. It could be questioned whether that 
could really be considered a success. The funds were transferred to another CBO for the 
execution of an additional project. But funds could have been used for that since the 
beginning of the second project. If the second CBO had received the funds a year or a 
couple of months before, it would have actually had more funds available. In a country 
where the local currency depreciates quickly, the first CBO actually transferred fewer 
dollars than it received from the HTA. 
 
 It was (and is still) assumed that the unwritten role of the HTAs was to provide money, 
and that of the local CBOs was to plan and execute the activities. Monitoring was 
largely dependent on visits from the HTAs. In fact, no real monitoring system was ever 
agreed.  Social sanctions were left as enforcing mechanisms. But, since the new SUNY 
board consider the informal character of monitoring was not enough to prevent moral 
hazard problems, they decided to unilaterally change the rules of the contract, without 
considering the local CBO’s point of view. The Patronato in Sangrelaya was informed  
that an international agency had donated an electric generator for the town’s 
electrification, and that only the cost of its instalment was still necessary. The hijos del 
pueblo in New York were called, as always, to give their aid. The HTA agreed, but to 
the Patronato’s surprise the HTA refused to provide the money, wanting to buy the 
materials itself. The Patronato considered this impractical, if not impossible.  The 
project was not started, and the flaws of the previous monitoring mechanisms were 
made evident. The last hypothesis has been proved true. Moral Hazard leads to 
ineffectiveness in the financed projects.   
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The generator is still stored somewhere, probably deteriorating from lack of use; the 
town inhabitants that cannot afford to buy gas for private generators are still using 
candles; some members of the HTA are beginning to resent contributing every month 
while no major projects are financed in the community. Yes, the duty of the hijos del 
pueblo provides the justification for migrants to raise money in a group and finance 
projects back home, but it seems it takes more than a good “hijo” to provide public 
goods in the Morenales. 
 
5.2. Overcoming the Factors Limiting Collective Remittances 
5.2.1 Limiting Determinants to the Provision of Public Goods via CR - The 
Implicit Nature of the Contracts 
• The Unclear or Unwritten Institutions within the HTAs (D1)  
 
As a result of the unclear rules within the HTAs (D1), conflicts between and 
demotivation of the HTA´s members occur. Members perceive it to be difficult to run 
the HTA and thus will not be willing to carry out additional activities for supplying CR 
for the hometowns’ public goods provisioning. In order words, this limiting factor can 
reduce the incentives, so that the HTAs decide that supplying CR to the local CBOs is 
just not worth the effort. In extreme cases the migrants perceive that the benefits derived 
from establishing and belonging to an HTA are lower than the costs. In this case the 
HTA ceases to exist, and no more CRs are then available to be transacted with the local 
CBOs.  
• The Unclear or Unwritten Institutions within the Patronatos (D2)   
 
The situation is similar with the Patronatos. The uncertainty from the unclear internal 
institutions is such that the inhabitants question the legitimacy of the Patronato. They 
are not longer willing to cooperate with it and as a result the Patronato remains inactive, 
its board members are demotivated and they might let it die. When the HTAs use 
screening in search of partners in the hometowns, these partners don’t exist, or don’t 
fulfil the HTA´s criteria for being selected. 
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• The Lack of Signalling Mechanisms for the Hometowns’ Needs (D3) 
 
One additional consequence of an inactive Patronato is that, even though the other side 
of the transaction is willing to provide CR, it is not able to determine in which project 
the CR should be invested. The Patronato doesn’t signal the hometown’s needs to the 
HTA, and the resulting uncertainty raises the level of the search and information cost 
for the HTA. Even if a partner in the community was to be found, it is not possible to 
bargain on the project to be executed. No contract is established.  
• Non-existent or Unwritten Institutions for Supplying CR (D4) 
 
As previously discussed, the internal institutions that create the incentives to transact 
CR are sometimes insufficient for allowing the contract’s implementation and 
enforcement. Since no agreement is written down, and the parties trust the socially 
accepted way of working, no plans are drawn. The generated uncertainty from both 
sides increases the level of the TAC. Unnecessary time and resources can be wasted just 
because the parties were not able to coordinate with each other’s strategy. The HTA 
might sent CR when not needed (for example, the electricity case), or the CBO might 
need funds at a time the HTA has none available. The result is not a transaction cost-
efficient contract. The project for providing public goods has wasted resources.  
• Non-existent or Unwritten Institutions for Monitoring CR (D5) 
 
The process of monitoring the use of CR is also based on good faith. But the case of 
Sangrelaya shows that trust is not perceived by the HTA as a sufficient guarantee 
against possible opportunism from the local CBO. SUNY´s rationality is limited; it 
couldn’t predict whether the funds were really going to be used in the best way. Just 
because projects had worked several times in the past was not enough for SUNY to be 
sure they would work in the future.  
 
• General Conclusion  
 
Figure 2 (Delimiting Determinants to the Effectiveness in the Provision of Public Goods 
financed by CR) summarises all the research conclusions. It illustrates the existence of 
limiting determinants both within the actors and in their interaction, for the transaction 
of CR financing the provision of public goods. Some of them prevent the transaction 
from taking place at all, while others reduce the effectiveness of the financed projects. 
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The five determinants that have been identified are the unclear or unwritten institutions 
within the HTAs (D1), the unclear or unwritten institutions within the local towns’ 
CBOs (D2), the lack of signalling mechanisms of the hometowns’ needs (D3), the non-
existent or unwritten institutions for supplying CR (D4), and the non-existent or 
unwritten institutions for monitoring the use of the CR (D5)   
 
Each Octagon in the figure represents a limiting determinant, and an arrow indicates a 
causal effect. For example, the lack of a monitoring mechanism for the projects’ 
execution (D3) results in hidden information, and this moral hazard means that the 
contract is not implemented as agreed, therefore the projects are ineffective. 
 
All five determinants can be summarised into the central octagon: The Implicit 
Character of the Contract, which itself relies on the internal institutions of the hijos del 
pueblo duty to help the community and the prestige of CBO members.  The contract 
between the HTAs and the local CBOs is unwritten and unarticulated, and the internal 
contracts regulating the Patronatos seem also to be unarticulated. HTAs are in the 
process of formalising these contracts, as they have started to write down statutes and 
rules, but such was not the case in the past. 
 
All past collective remittances experiences in the hometowns studied have relied on an 
implicit contract. The HTAs lacked formal monitoring mechanisms and thus 
enforcement was left in the hands of the customs sanctioned by society. Because 
Patronatos worked continually with the HTAs, as was the case in the two projects in 
Limón, the price of losing prestige was high. The lost of trust in the Patronato meant no 
future CRs were to be expected. Such is the current situation. HTAs do not accept any 
more that relying on the informal institutions of the past is enough guarantee to prevent 
opportunistic behaviour from CBOs. Because the TAC of monitoring CBOs are so high 
and the HTAs find no enforcing mechanism other than breaking the contract, the CR 
market breaks down. Therefore the internal institutions seem not to be working any 
more.  
 
 
 
 
 
 74
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Limiting Determinants to the Provision of Public 
Goods Financed by CR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Principal  
 
Hometown 
Association 
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unclear or 
unwritten 
institutions 
within the 
HTAs 
(D1) 
Agent 
 
Community-Based 
Organisation 
 
 
Institutions- Internal Character! 
Ethic Rule - >Duty of the hijos del pueblo 
Customs   - > Reputation, prestige, kinship 
Unclear or 
unwritten 
institutions 
within the 
Patronatos  
(term’s length) 
(D2) 
* Not recognised 
by locals 
* Demotivation 
CBO 
dies 
          
 
 
 
 
Lack of 
signalling 
mechanism 
for 
hometown 
needs (D3) Adverse 
Selection 
Problems 
No 
contract 
established
Conflict / 
Demotivation 
Desertion-
HTA dies  
Implicit 
Character    
of the 
Contract  
 
Moral Hazard 
Problems 
Ineffectiveness of 
financed projects 
Contract Established 
       HTA agrees to supplying CR  
Non-
existent/ 
unwritten 
mon.project 
execution 
(D5) 
Non-
existent/ 
unwritten 
instit. for 
supplying 
CR (D4) 
 
 
 
 
 75
5.2.2 Recommendations - Effectiveness-Enhancing Alternatives 
 
The determinants that generate the TAC in the transacting of CR are mostly of an 
institutional character. The current institutions are not TAC efficient. Changing the 
nature of such institutions could prove useful. 
• Organisational Strengthening and Formal Institutions in the HTAs 
 
The HTAs have taken positive steps by concentrating on strengthening their  
organisations. Being legally constituted gives them a more formal character and allows 
them to apply for tax exemption status. This alternative will force them to become an 
even more formal organisation, but it opens the possibility of increasing their financial 
capacity.  
• Organisational Strengthening and Formal Institutions in the Patronatos & New 
Partners for the HTAs 
 
The current inactivity of many Patronatos and committees represents an obstacle for any 
plan of using remittances in the hometowns with more developmental impact. It is 
crucial that the Patronatos decide and divulge their basic rules, including those 
concerning their term of duration. It is useless to have statutes and legal structures if 
members ignore them or the rules are not applied.  
 
Even though all the interviewed HTAs have previous working experience with (and 
consider that their partners should be) the Patronatos, local committees and Pastorales, 
the possibility of working with NGOs and other organisations in the hometowns could 
be a convenient alternative to the inactive Patronatos. During the field research the 
presence of several NGOs was observed in the hometowns. Cantor mentions two 
additional types of organisations operating in or with interests in the Morenales. They 
include the pan-Garífuna or African heritage and cultural groups that address the needs 
of multiple communities, like ODECO and OFRANEH, as well as business-related 
organisations that invest or encourage investment in the communities, like the Afro-
Honduran Chamber of Commerce in Tegucigalpa.105 
 
                                                 
105 See Cantor (2004), pp. 38. 
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Since these NGOs may have a well-defined structure and management capacity, they 
could be adequate partners for the HTAs. NGOs also have greater likelihood than the 
Patronatos of finding financing partners to complement the funds of the HTAs. 
Although many of the migrants interviewed knew of the existence of these NGOs, they 
have not tried to establish formal contact with them.  
• Locally Defined Projects and the Municipal Government’s Participation 
 
Experience has shown that those ideas which have worked for the execution of projects 
usually come from the local inhabitants. Even if an HTA is truly driven by the desire to 
help the community, the local inhabitants are the ones more able to execute the work. 
Orozco considers that two of the criteria for evaluating the developmental impact of 
projects carried out by HTAs are ownership by local inhabitants and the sustainability 
of the work106. Once the projects are concluded, a lack of ownership from the 
hometown would probably mean that the projects would not be adequately maintained. 
Thus, it is necessary that the community generates a mechanism to propose realistic 
projects to the HTAs.  
 
Even though the municipal authorities have not yet been involved in CR-financed 
projects, the government’s participation might prove useful. Local authorities could 
play a role in helping the Patronatos to organise projects.  Members of one interviewed 
HTA have already started discussing the possibility of working with the municipality. 
An interesting finding during the research was the fact that the municipalities in the 
hometowns have strategic development plans for the towns. These plans are written 
with the assistance of NGOs and the participation of the entire town. One of their goals 
is to prioritise the needs of the community to improve living conditions in the coming 
10 years. Such plans could be a solution to the lack of signalling mechanisms in project 
selection. 
• Formal and Written Implementing and Monitoring Institutions 
 
In future projects involving CR it would be useful to formally create a calendar for 
disbursements and a system of monitoring. Planning the periodicity of funds and the 
form in which they will be made available to the CBOs will reduce uncertainty and the 
possibility of conflict. In the beginning, resistance from either side might arise. 
                                                 
106 See Orozco and Welle (2005), pp. 2. 
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Agreeing on more formal terms presupposes changing the way things have traditionally 
been done. But it is likely that if contracts continue to work in the same way they have 
in the past, the full potential of HTAs and Patronatos will not be used and the practice 
of CR might come to an end. Once a formal system of disbursement and monitoring is 
used in a particular project, it can be reproduced in future ones. 
 
Table 9 (Effectiveness-enhancing alternatives in the transacting of CR for the provision 
of public goods) suggests some measures for overcoming the determinants that limit the 
effectiveness of the provision of public goods via CR.  
 
Table 9: Effectiveness-enhancing Alternatives in the Transacting of CR for the 
Provision of Public Goods 
 
Causing Determinant 
 
Pro-Efficiency 
Alternative 
Description 
1. Unclear or unwritten 
institutions within the 
HTAs (D1) 
 
Organisational 
Strengthening  
 
Formal and known 
institutions 
* Legal & Tax Exemption 
Status 
 
* Divulging and application of 
Statutes 
 
2. Unclear or unwritten 
institutions within the 
Patronatos (D2) 
 
Organisational 
Strengthening 
 
 
Formal and known 
institutions 
 
 
New Partners 
* More Active Patronatos   
   (Committees)   
* Legal Status 
 
* Written and community-
known institutions ( Statutes 
and election rules) 
 
* Partnerships with new actors: 
NGOs working in the 
hometowns? 
3. Lack of a signalling 
mechanism for the 
hometowns’ needs (D3) 
Locally driven definition 
of projects 
 
 
 
 
 
Local Government 
participation 
* Development and 
implementation of locally-
based mechanism for the 
prioritisation of the towns` 
needs and   the proposal of 
projects ideas. 
 
* Municipal Strategic 
Development plan? 
4. Non-existent / unwritten 
institutions for supplying 
CR (D4) 
Formal and written 
implementing 
institutions 
* Calendar of Disbursements 
* Formal System of CR transfer 
5. Non-existent / unwritten 
institutions’ use of CR 
(D5) 
Formal and written 
monitoring institutions 
* Formal System of monitoring 
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5.3 Some Questions left to be answered, and Final Remarks 
 
It would be rather simplistic to assume that the mere introduction of formal rules will 
solve all the obstacles stopping CR from serving as a financing tool for the provision of 
public goods in the hometowns. One of the central assumptions of NIE is precisely that 
setting up institutions is costly. Answering whether or not the introduction of formal 
institutions, and the participation of the state in CR contracts, would be more TAC-
efficient than the informal rules of society is a question that requires further study. A 
comparative analysis of the efficiency of the CR experiences under different contractual 
arrangements would be of great use. It would be particularly interesting to compare  the 
different programs that countries such as Mexico and El Salvador  are currently 
implementing, and by doing so perhaps proposing a program for  the Honduran Case. 
CR in Honduras is still an unexplored subject. A census of Honduran HTAs is a good 
departure point for studying it. Certainly, CR experiences are to be found in other parts 
of the country, but they have not been documented.  
 
In this study the donations of HTAs are seen to be financing public goods in the 
hometowns. An interesting approach, and one with useful applicability, would be to use 
strategic games to study HTAs as a form of spontaneous collective action for providing 
public goods. The range of activities in which HTAs can be involved is broad, and when 
considering all the different ways their funds are used, the very concept of designating a 
particular type of remittances as “collective” is questionable. The possibility of HTAs 
investing in profit-generating and job-generating projects in the hometowns, although 
not strictly resulting in collective remittances as defined in this study, is an alternative 
with promising developmental impact. Some HTA investment experiences have already 
occurred in Mexico107 and one is currently starting in Honduras. New Horizon 
Investment, a private Garífuna migrant-owned firm, has received a loan from the IADB 
for investing in tourism projects in the Morenales. The investment of a migrant group in 
private projects that generate profit to the migrants, while at the same time contributing 
to their hometown’s development, is a topic of research with useful applicability. It 
could suggest new development opportunities for the Garífuna and it is one in which the 
TAC and Agency problems could also be studied. 
 
                                                 
107 See Orozco and Welles (2005), pp. 12-13, 19-20, 24-25, 26-27. 
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Finally it should be borne in mind that, although the HTAs have contributed 
significantly to alleviating many of the hometowns’ problems, they have a limited 
capacity. It cannot be expected that they finance costly projects by themselves. Their 
participation should be seen as complementary to the inhabitants’ work, and to the 
responsibilities of the central authorities.   
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List of Informants 
 
Name Organisation Position  Place of 
Interview 
1. Regil Solis Garífuna Coalition 
(GC) 
President New York 
2. Ernesto Martínez Organisation of 
Ladies from Limón 
in New York (GC) 
Coordinator New York 
3. Marcia Gómez  Organisation of 
Ladies from Limón 
in New York (GC) 
Fiscal New York 
4. Inés Tróchez  Ladies from Santa Fé 
in New York 
Former member 
and President 
Santa Fé 
5. Isabel Guerrero Ladies from Santa Fé 
in New York 
Member Santa Fé 
6. Felícito Cacho Organisation for the 
Development of 
Aguan (CG) 
Fiscal New York 
7. Marvin Centeno Sangrelayas Unidos 
in New York 
(SUNY) 
President New York 
8. Gustavo Batiz SUNY Coordinator New York 
9. Sandra Guitiérrez  SUNY Former member New York 
10. Florentino Arriola SUNY Former member 
and President 
Sangrelaya 
11. José Francisco Àvila NEW Horizons 
Investment Club 
(GC) 
President New York 
12. Mirta Colon Hondureños contra el 
Sida NGO 
 
President New York 
GC Former Member 
13. Eric Cantor Author of Work on 
“Remittances and 
Development: 
Lessons from the 
Garífuna 
Transnational 
Community” 
 
Researcher New York 
14. Sixto Pastor Oviedo Municipality of 
Limón 
 
Major 
 
Limón 
Former  Local 
Committee for the 
electrification of 
Limón 
Former Treasurer 
15. Vidal Armando 
Castillo 
Municipality of 
Santa Fé 
Major Deputy Santa Fé 
16. Leonor Guerrero, 
Irene Martínez 
Group of Ladies in 
Limón 
Members Limón 
17. Berta Meléndez Group of Ladies in 
Santa Fé 
Coordinator Santa Fé 
18. Irvin Bernández Patronato of Limón President Deputy Limón 
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Name Organisation Position  Place of 
Interview 
19. Vicente Loredo Patronato of Santa 
Fé 
President  Santa Fé 
20. Eusebio Centeno Water administration 
Committee 
 
President Sangrelaya 
Patronato of 
Sangrelaya  
Former Secretary 
21. Bernardo Ramírez Former  Local 
Committee for the 
electrification of 
Limón 
Former President Limón 
22. Victor Molina Former Committee 
for  Potable Water in 
Limón 
Former Treasurer Limón 
23. Manuel Manaiza Pastoral de la Iglesia 
Católica en Limón 
 Limón 
24. Bernardo Batíz Patronato of Santa 
Fé 
Former President Santa Fé 
Pastoral de la Iglesia 
Católica en Santa Fé 
Member 
25. Ricardo Velasquez APROSA- Local 
NGO Asociacion de 
Profesionales de 
Sangrelaya 
Project Manager Sangrelaya 
26. Ricardo Puerta  Remittances Group 
Private Consultant 
on Remittances 
Researcher Tegucigalpa, 
Email 
communication 
27. Leticia Zúniga 
 
UNISA- Unidad de 
Apoyo de Servicios a 
a la mujer- NGO 
Member of 
Remittances Group 
Director Tegucigalpa 
28. Melisa Ochoa  ANDAR-NGO 
member of 
Remittance Group 
Project Officer Tegucigalpa 
29. Rene Becerra Presidential 
Commission for 
Honduran 
Communities Living 
Abroad 
Presidential 
Commissioner  
Tegucigalpa 
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A1. Interview Guidelines 
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A.1.1  Interview Guideline HTA 
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A.2.1  Interview Guideline Local CBO 
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A2. Time Table of Field Research 
 
 
  Weeks 
First week:  1st August, 2005  Last Week: 26th September,2005  
Total  No. of  working weeks: 8 
Activities Location Week  
1 
Aug. 
01 
Week 
2 
Aug. 
08 
Week 
3 
Aug.  
15 
Week 
4 
Aug.  
29 
Week 
5 
Sep.  
05 
Week 
6 
Sep.  
12 
Week 
7 
Sep.  
19 
Week 
 8 
Sep.  
26 
Flight to NYC  x        
Initial Contact 
with HTA 
members  
NYC     xx        
Interview with 
HTAs  
NYC      xx xxxxx       
Meetings with 
experts of the 
remesas network 
and the 
Presidential 
Comissioner 
Tegucigalpa   xxxxx      
Document 
Research at the 
remesas network 
Tegucigalpa    xx     
Initial contact with 
Community 
leaders in 
Morenales 
Tegucigalpa       xxx     
Trip to the 
Morenales 
     x    
Interviews with 
local CBOs, 
municipal 
authorities and 
inhabitants 
Morenales       xxxx xx   
Return Trip to 
Tegucigalpa  and 
Flight to NYC 
Tegucigalpa              
    xxx 
  
Interview HTAS NYC       xxxxx xxxx 
Return Trip to 
Germany 
                    
        x 
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A3. HTA Documents 
 
A3.1 Membership Identification- SUNY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A3.2 Ticket for Raffle Organised by SUNY 
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A3.3 Certificate of Incorporation as a Domestic Not-for-Profit Organisation of  
         the Ladies from Limón in Limón  
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A3.4 Certificate of Incorporation as a Domestic Not-for-Profit Organisation of  
          the Organisation for the Development of Aguan 
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 A4.1 LimónTown 
 
 
 
Church constructed with support of HTA 
 
 
 
 
Electricity installed with support of HTA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A4.2 Santa Fé Town 
 
 
 
 
Communal Centre Financed by HTA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A4.3 Sangrelaya Town 
 
© Carlos G. Villela 
© Carlos G. Villela
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Communal Centre build with support of HTA 
 
 
 
© Carlos G. Villela
© Carlos G. Villela
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A5 Actors of Collective Remittances 
 
 
A5.1 Home Town Associations: Suppliers of Collective Remittances 
 
 
*Barbecue organised by Honduran HTA members of the Garífuna Coalition for 
raising funds to help Katrina Hurricane Victims, Crotona Park, Bronx, NYC 
 
A5.2 Groups in the Home Towns: Recipients of Collective Remittances 
 
 
 
*Ladies of Limón in Limón and Researcher in front of the Temple constructed 
with support of the HTA in NYC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A5.3 Transacting of Collective Remittances:   
HTAs & Their Local Partners 
 
 
*On the Left: Mrs. Isabel Guerrero, Member of Santa Fé’s HTA in NYC & on the 
right: Mrs. Berta Melendez, Member of the Ladies from Santa Fé in Santa Fé  
 
 A5.4 Home Towns’ Inhabitants: 
Beneficiaries of Collective Remittances 
 
 
 
* Young inhabitants of Sangrelaya sitting in front of the Communal Centre built 
with support of the HTA in NYC.  
 
 
 
 
 
